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ABSTRACT 
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The legitimacy of judicial review seems recently to be under serious critique 
both empirically and theoretically. It seems as if that currently a struggle has been 
started on the part of the legislature in order to reclaim parliaments‟ share in ensuring 
the superiority of the constitution, a role which has been delegated exclusively to the 
judiciary for a long period of time.  
The intention of this thesis is to understand the location of Turkey within the 
context of the recent struggle which has been started on the part of the legislature to 
reclaim its share in ensuring the superiority of the constitution and constitutional rights. 
This thesis specifically focuses on the Commission on Human Rights Inquiry (CoHRI) 
as it is the first national human rights protection mechanism established in Turkey 
operating at the parliamentary level. In this regard, a descriptive analysis of the 
CoHRI‟s performance of its functions that are related to providing a pre-emptive right 
review is made. 
The descriptive analysis suggests that both the legal status of the CoHRI, which 
results from the formal rules and regulations on legislative commissions generally and 
on CoHRI particularly; and the functioning of TBMM as a plenary body form of 
legislature decrease the level of influence CoHRI has in terms of providing a pre-
emptive right review mechanism. 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
ĠNSAN HAKLARINI ĠNCELEME KOMĠSYONU: ANAYASACILIK ÜZERĠNE 
YAPILAN GÜNCEL TARTIġMALAR BAĞLAMINDA BĠR VAKA ÇALIġMASI 
OLARAK TÜRKĠYE 
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Siyaset Bilimi, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2014 
 
Tez DanıĢmanı: Ersin Mahmut Kalaycıoğlu  
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, anayasacılık, önleyici hak 
denetimi, insan hakları 
 
Son zamanlarda yargı denetimi hem empirik hem de teorik düzlemlerde ciddi bir 
şekilde eleştiriliyor. Yasama organları, uzun bir zamandır yalnızca yargı organına 
devredilmiş olan anayasanın üstünlüğünü temin etme görevindeki paylarını geri alma 
mücadelesi başlatmış görünüyor. 
Bu tezin amacı, yasama organları tarafından anayasanın ve anayasal hakların 
üstünlüğünü temin etme görevindeki paylarını geri alma konusunda başlatılan mücadele 
bağlamında Türkiye‟nin yerini anlamaya çalışmak. Bu tez özel olarak yasama organı 
kapsamında kurulmuş ilk ulusal insan hakları koruma mekanizması olan İnsan Haklarını 
İnceleme Komisyonu‟na odaklanıyor. Bu bağlamda İnsan Haklarını İnceleme 
Komisyonu‟nun önleyici hak denetimi mekanizması olarak çalışmasına ilişkin 
işlevlerini yerine getirmesi üzerine tanımlayıcı bir analiz yapılacaktır. 
Yapılan bu analiz hem İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu‟nun genel olarak 
yasama komisyonları, özel olarak ise İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu ile ilgili 
yasal düzenlemelerin ve prosedürlerin sonucunda ortaya çıkan yasal konumunun; hem 
de Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi‟nin tümel bir bütün olarak çalışan bir yasama organı 
olmasının İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu‟nun önleyici bir hak denetimi 
mekanizması olarak etkisini azalttığını ortaya koyuyor. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Checks and balances system has been recognized as one of the most significant 
pillars of democracies as it ensures that none of the three branches of government can 
become too powerful. When the history of checks and balances system is analyzed, the 
World War II can be identified as a turning point. Prior to the World War II, legislative 
supremacy and constitutionalism constituted two different principles which are 
irreconcilable with each other. In this regard the judicial review of legislations was 
considered not to be going hand in hand with the principle of legislative supremacy 
(Sweet, 2002, pp. 78-79; Gardbaum, 2001, p. 707). In this regard the principle of 
legislative supremacy is considered as sufficient alone to ensure an effective protection 
of constitution.  
However, the period succeeding the World War II witnessed the marginalization 
of the principle of legislative supremacy; because the idea that an effective protection of 
constitutional rights cannot be compatible with the principle of legislative supremacy 
became more and more dominant. In this regard the American experience of checks and 
balances system began to be established in other countries and American model of 
judiciary-based constitutionalism became widespread to an unprecedented extent. In 
this period countries, which have been opting for the principle of legislative supremacy 
previously, started to adopt fundamentals of American model of constitutionalism in the 
face of majoritarian take-overs leading to the World War II. In this regard many 
countries adopted a list of fundamental rights and freedoms and delegated the main 
responsibility of ensuring the superiority of the constitution to the judiciary branch of 
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government by allowing judiciary review of the legislation (Gardbaum; 2001, pp. 714-
715; Sweet, 2002, p. 79; Sweet, 2000, p. 31).  
Given that anti-majoritarian concerns played a significant role in the 
marginalization of the principle of legislative supremacy, which took place at the 
empirical ground after World War II, the theoretical discussions on the legitimacy of 
judicial review of legislation establish the legitimacy of judicial review on the basis of 
the compatibility between judicial review and more substantive definitions of 
democracy (Freeman, 1990-1991). In this line of thought, it is argued that in minimalist 
definitions of democracy procedural methods, such as majority rule, take precedence 
over the very principles for the service of which these procedural methods are 
established in the first place. When the significance of the principles, underlying 
democracy, is ignored and procedural methods are overemphasized in a political 
system, judicial review is considered as an illegitimate act. This is so; because 
limitations on legislative outcomes imposed by judicial review are perceived to be 
constraining the citizens‟ right to participate in the decision making process which is in 
the form of determining electoral outcome (Freeman, 1990-1991, p. 333).  
However, it is argued by the proponents of the judicial review that when a more 
substantive definition of democracy is adopted, the realization of principles underlying 
democracy becomes of primary importance and in this sense judicial review can be 
considered as contributing to the assurance of the realization of these principles. 
Accordingly, judicial review is an appropriate democratic institution, rather than being 
incompatible with democracy, to protect the fundamental principles of democracy by 
ensuring the sovereign power of each citizen and by checking the compatibility of 
legislative and executive outcomes with the interest of the each citizen (Freeman, 1990-
1991, p. 353). 
However, the legitimacy of judicial review seems recently to be under serious 
critique both empirically and theoretically again. It seems as if that currently a struggle 
has been started on the part of the legislature in order to reclaim parliaments‟ share in 
ensuring the superiority of the constitution, a role which has been delegated exclusively 
to the judiciary for a long period of time. In this regard the judiciary-based model of 
constitutionalism has been criticized on the grounds that there is necessarily no 
contradiction between legislative supremacy and effective protection of constitutional 
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rights. In this regard these criticisms reclaim the role of branches of government other 
than the judiciary in ensuring the superiority of the constitution. These criticisms built 
upon two streams of arguments in challenging the legitimacy of judiciary review. 
Firstly, these criticisms refer to studies about the problems with respect to the 
compatibility of judicial review with the principles of democracy; and secondly they 
refer to studies about whether outcomes of judicial review, as perceived by the 
proponents of it, hold true in the face of the empirical data.  
First stream of studies, which establish the incompatibility of judicial review 
with democracy, base their justification on a procedural definition of democracy. In this 
regard, constrains imposed upon by courts on the legislative or executive outcomes, 
which come about through legitimately democratic procedures, is emphasized. It is 
argued that democracy should only be understood in procedural terms in the sense that 
majority rule is the only feasible and therefore appropriate method for ensuring the 
equal participation of each citizen and equal consideration of each different interest in 
the policy making process. In this regard judicial review is argued to be illegitimate in a 
democratic regime; because it imposes an unjustifiable constraint on citizens‟ right to 
participate in decision making process by overruling some outcomes which come about 
through the procedures that ensures the equal participation of each citizen and 
consideration of each different interest in a given society (Nelson, 1980; Walzer, 1981).  
Second stream of studies which are intended to explain whether outcomes of 
judicial review, as perceived by the proponents of it, hold true in the face of the 
empirical data, base their arguments on the nature of mechanisms operating in the 
decision making process of judicial review (Waldron, 1994). In this line of thought it is 
argued that the criticism, which is put on minimalist definitions of democracy on the 
basis of the overemphasis on procedural rules in democratic process, can be equally 
directed to judicial review process itself. In this regard the mechanisms, which operate 
in the judicial review process, are argued to be equally majoritarian and procedurally 
defined. This means there is no substantive constraint on the outcomes produced by 
judicial review apart from the constitution itself which is also equally binding for the 
members of the legislative or executive branches of government. Therefore, it is argued 
that given the equal dominance of procedural and majoritarian rules in judicial review 
as in legislative process, there is no firm ground on the basis of which judicial review by 
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courts can be argued to be a more effective way of ensuring a more substantive 
conception of democracy.  
In these studies it is also argued that given the outcomes of judicial review and 
limitations of it, relying solely on judicial review by courts in ensuring an effective 
constitutional regime needs to be questioned (Hiebert, 2005, 2006b; Ackerman, 2000). 
The main argument in these studies is that checking whether legislative and executive 
outcomes are compatible with the interest of each citizen cannot be confined to judicial 
review by courts. It is argued that even though judicial review is one of the most 
significant democratic institutions in a liberal constitutional regime it should not be the 
only one. Judicial review of legislative and executive outcomes needs to be 
accompanied by other types of institutional arrangements within already existing 
branches of government in order to have a more effective constitutional regime. 
The criticism of American model of judiciary-based constitutionalism on the 
grounds that there is necessarily no contradiction between legislative supremacy and 
effective protection of constitutional rights, also provided alternative ways of 
conceiving constitutionalism as a founding principle of democracy. The skeptical 
position in question challenges basically the idea that judiciary needs to be the 
institution that society should rely on exclusively for an effective human rights 
protection.  
What is more significant from a theoretical point of view is the new approach, 
which is brought about by these discussions on alternative models of constitutionalism, 
to the protection of rights (Hiebert, 2006a, p. 5). Within the context of the discussions 
on new approach to the protection of rights; it is argued that the responsibility of 
providing a resolution to rights issues needs to be allocated to different right review 
mechanisms which are established at various state levels alongside judiciary (Hiebert, 
2006b, p. 10).  The new approach to the protection of rights also re-visions the role of 
national human rights protection mechanisms by widening their scope of function from 
a sole role of monitoring the application of universal human rights at the national level 
to a more participatory role of integrating human rights perspective into the earlier 
phases of policy making and providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. 
This thesis intends to understand the location of Turkey within the context of the 
recent struggle which has been started on the part of the legislature to reclaim its share 
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in ensuring the superiority of the constitution and constitutional rights. In this regard, I 
will specifically focus on Commission on Human Rights Inquiry as it is the first 
national human rights protection mechanism established in Turkey operating at the 
parliamentary level.  
The idea to establish a parliamentary commission which is supposed to 
specialize on issues of human rights violation, were stimulated within the context of 
Turkey‟s application for the full membership to the European Union, back then the 
European Economic Community, in 1987 (General Information about the Human 
Rights Inquiry). These discussions turned into a concrete act with the preparation of a 
legislative proposal by the four members of the Turkish National Assembly. This 
proposal is intended to define the rules governing the establishment of a commission on 
human rights in Turkish Grand National Assembly and to lay out its functions, 
competencies and its principles of working. Besides fulfilling requirements of 
international treaties and universal declarations on human rights with respect to the 
establishment of national human rights protection mechanisms; a significant motivation 
behind the establishment of the Commission on Human Rights Inquiry (CoHRI) is to 
provide a complementary mechanism, besides judiciary, at the legislative level for 
human rights protection in Turkey (General Assembly Discussion, 18
th
 Term 4
th
 
Legislative Year 42
nd
 Session, pp. 1-2).  
The potential capacity of the CoHRI, as the first national human rights 
protection mechanism in Turkey, in terms of providing a pre-emptive right review 
mechanism besides judicial review is quite significant; yet an academic study on the 
work of CoHRI within the context of latest discussions in the literature on 
constitutionalism about the alternative ways of human rights review has not been made. 
The focus of this thesis is to make a descriptive analysis of the CoHRI‟s work within 
the context of the new perspective, which is brought about by the struggle of the 
legislatures to reclaim their role in ensuring the superiority of the constitutional rights, 
to the national human rights protection institutions. In this regard this thesis‟s focus will 
be on the CoHRI‟ function of integrating human rights perspective into the earlier 
phases of policy making and providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. 
This thesis is composed of three additional chapters following the current first 
chapter on Introduction. Chapter II is intended to set the theoretical and methodological 
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framework for this thesis. In this regard recent discussions in the literature on 
constitutionalism on alternative models of constitutionalism will be introduced and how 
these discussions bring about a new approach to human rights protection will be 
discussed. In Chapter II how such a new approach to human rights protection re-defines 
the roles of human rights protection mechanisms, operating at the national level will be 
discussed too. In Chapter II a review of the literature on parliamentary committees will 
be made given that this thesis methodologically will build upon this literature. In this 
regard the methodological discussions in the literature on parliamentary committees as 
to how to assess the committee work will be introduced. Moreover in Chapter II in the 
light of the recent theoretical discussions on alternative models of constitutionalism, 
Turkey‟s place will be discussed; the hypotheses of this thesis stated and the literature 
on parliamentary commissions in Turkey will be introduced. 
Chapter III is devoted to the description of the methodology to test the two 
hypothesis of this thesis and to the data analysis. Firstly, in the light of the 
methodological discussions, introduced in the Chapter II, the methodology adopted by 
this thesis will be defined. Secondly data analysis, which will be composed of two parts, 
will be made. First part is intended to reveal the legal framework about CoHRI. In this 
regard in the first part an analysis will be made on how the rules governing both the 
inner functioning of CoHRI and its relation to the overall law making process in the 
legislature is laid out in various official documents. Second part is intended to reveal the 
impact of CoHRI in terms of integrating human rights perspective into the earlier phases 
of policy making and providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. In this regard 
the influence of the CoHRI on government and on parliament will be analyzed. In this 
part legislative reports, which are produced as a result of the review function of the 
CoHRI, and investigator reports, which are produced as a result of the investigatory 
function of the CoHRI will constitute the subject matter of the analysis. The analysis on 
legislative and investigatory reports will be backed up by the qualitative interviews 
which I conducted with both the members of the Grand National Assembly and 
bureaucrats who work at the Committee on Human Rights Inquiry. 
Chapter IV will contain the conclusions that can be drawn from the data analysis made 
in the Chapter III.
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1: Overview 
Within the context of the latest struggle which has started on the part of the 
legislature to reclaim its share in ensuring the superiority of the constitution and 
constitutional rights, a new phenomenon has emerged in the literature on 
constitutionalism. The critical position in question challenges the paradigmatic model of 
judiciary-based constitutionalism and offers alternative ways of conceiving 
constitutionalism as a founding principle of democracy. However, there are varieties of 
positions within this new phenomenon; even though these positions are similar in their 
efforts at challenging predominant model of judicial review-based constitutionalism. 
The positions can broadly be classified, on the basis of their perception of bill of rights, 
respectively as “rights skeptics” and “court skeptics” (Hiebert, 2006, pp. 9-10; 
Campbell, Ewing & Tomkins, 2001, p. 8).  
“Right skeptics” position, the main arguments of which are laid out 
systematically by Richard Bellamy (2007), constitutes a more extreme critical stance 
towards judiciary-based constitutionalism model. According to this position enlisting of 
individual rights and assignment of the role of legal protection of the individual rights to 
judiciary exclusively cannot be compatible with a republican conception of citizenship. 
It is argued that republican conception of citizenship presumes the relationship between 
individuals as an actively ongoing process in which individuals constantly reflect and 
renew the rules governing their lives. Accordingly, this is why the relationship between 
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citizens cannot be constrained into a relationship of right bearers as in the case of 
judiciary-based constitutionalism model (Bellamy, 2001, p. 16). In this regard this 
position can be considered as a strong critique against the concept of bill of rights which 
is enlisted in a constitution and ensured through judiciary mechanisms. Moreover, this 
position also disagrees with the idea of sole reliance on judicial review as an effective 
right protection mechanism. It is argued that the responsibility of reflecting upon the 
rules and normative frameworks, which govern individuals‟ lives, belongs to each and 
every individual in the society; and therefore there is no legitimate argument as to why 
judiciary should have this responsibility at the exclusion of the rest of the society. In 
this respect it is argued that a republican conception of citizenship can be better realized 
in a model of “political constitutionalism” where individuals‟ constant reflection on 
rules, governing their lives, is ensured through traditional democratic mechanisms such 
as elections and majority rule (p. 38). 
“Court skeptics” position, which constitutes a more modest stance and therefore 
is more relevant for the purposes of this study, accepts the legitimacy of the bill of 
rights; however it challenges almost paradigmatic reliance on judicial review 
exclusively for the protection of the individual rights (Campbell et al., 2001, pp. 9-10). 
According to this position sole reliance on judicial review as an effective mechanism of 
rights protection rule out any possibility of inclusion of rights issues into political 
deliberation. It is argued that rights issues can legitimately be included in political 
debates and since there is no legitimate argument as to why judiciary should have an 
authoritative voice in such a political deliberation at the exclusion of the rest of the 
society (Hiebert, 2005, pp. 237-238); the responsibility of providing a resolution to 
rights issues belongs also to different right review mechanism which are established at 
both executive and legislative levels alongside judicial review (Hiebert, 2006b, p. 10).   
These theoretical discussions, challenging judiciary-based model of 
constitutionalism, have also empirical correspondence given that some countries, such 
as UK or Canada, adopted some institutional arrangements which reinforce alternative 
constitutional ideas that are discussed in the literature. These new institutional 
arrangements foresee the possibility for the inclusion of rights issues into political 
debate and therefore establish different right review mechanisms at both executive and 
legislative levels alongside judicial review; and pave way for the possibility of political 
disagreement with judicial declarations of incompatibility with fundamental rights of 
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legislative and executive acts. In this respect these characteristics of new institutional 
arrangements stands in a complete contrast to the underlying principles of judiciary-
based constitutional model (Gardbaum, 2001; Hiebert, 2006b). 
However, even though the implementation of these new constitutional ideas is 
limited on the empirical ground until now, what is more significant from a more 
theoretical point of view, is the new approach, which is brought about by these 
discussions on alternative models of constitutionalism, to the protection of rights in 
society (Hiebert, 2006a, p. 5). This new approach to projection of rights is different; 
because firstly it encourages political rights review by foreseeing the inclusion of 
institutional actors, other than the judiciary in the responsibility of ensuring the 
compatibility of state‟s action with individual rights; secondly by enlarging the scope of 
rights review in the policy making process it aims at creating a culture of rights, which 
would stimulate both at executive and legislative levels greater reflection on policy 
making from a rights perspective (Hiebert, 2006a, pp. 35-36); thirdly it foresees a more 
interactive relationship between different branches of government given that whole 
branches have right review mechanisms and are responsible for rights protection 
(Hiebert, 2006a, p. 5; Hiebert, 2001).  
The new approach to the protection of rights also brings a new perspective to the 
human rights protection mechanisms operating at the national level. The standards for 
the national human rights protection mechanisms have been set by a universal document 
known also as the Paris Principles. Paris Principles were adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1993 and became the most significant universal document which 
defines the framework for the proper functioning of the national human rights 
protection mechanisms. Paris Principles define various aspects of a properly functioning 
national human rights protection mechanism including the status of the national human 
rights protection mechanisms; their competencies and functions; the principles 
governing the composition and the working methods of NHRIs and etc (Principles 
relating to the Status of National Institutions).  
Since its adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in 1993, Paris 
Principles have been the main document which national human rights protection 
institutions are supposed to comply with. However, the new approach, which is brought 
about by recent discussions on alternative models of constitutionalism, to the protection 
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of human rights actually allows a re-reading of the Paris Principles. This is so; because 
the new approach to human rights protection encourages the inclusion of institutional 
actors both at executive and legislative levels, other than the judiciary in the 
responsibility of ensuring the compatibility of state‟s action with human rights.  
In this regard the new approach highlights the significance of the indispensable 
role of alternative right review mechanisms besides judicial review for an effective 
protection of human rights in the society. Moreover it promotes a greater reflection 
from a rights perspective in the policy making process by enlarging the scope of rights 
review. Accordingly the ideas, which are associated with the new approach to human 
rights protection, emphasize the role of alternative human rights protection mechanisms 
in integrating human rights perspective into the earlier phases of policy making. In this 
regard the new approach in question revises the functions of national human rights 
protection mechanisms by restoring the under-emphasized significance of them in 
taking an active role in providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism besides their 
monitoring functions. In this regard the new approach to human rights protection also a 
more active role for national human rights protection in being an alternative channel for 
the participation of civil society organizations in the earlier phases of law-making.  
 
2.2: Works on Parliamentary Committees 
This thesis methodologically builds upon the literature on parliamentary 
committees because the aim of this thesis is to make a descriptive analysis of the 
CoHRI‟s activity within the context of the new perspective, which is brought about by 
the latest struggle of legislatures to reclaim their share in ensuring the superiority of the 
constitutional rights to the national human rights protection institutions. In the light of 
these methodological discussions in the literature on parliamentary committees as to 
how to assess the committee work; this thesis intends to make a descriptive analysis of 
the CoHRI‟s function of integrating human rights perspective into the earlier phases of 
policy making and providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. 
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2.2.1: Concepts and Categorizations on Parliamentary Committees  
Strom defines parliamentary committees as a “sub-group of legislators, normally 
a group entrusted with specific organizational tasks” (1998, p. 22). Strom argues that 
the organizational arrangement of the legislation necessitates “vertical” and “horizontal 
differentiations” among the members of the legislation. These all sorts of vertical and 
horizontal differentiations, corresponding to the necessities of the organizational 
arrangement of the legislation, result in emergence of the “privileged groups” in which 
a set of the members of the legislature is entrusted with particular functions (p. 23). 
According to Strom parliamentary committees can be considered as a privileged group 
within the legislature and the power of a parliamentary committee lies in the overall 
increase in the political cost of bypassing such a privileged group, once they are 
entrusted with particular functions, by the other actors in the political system (p. 24). 
Similar to the conceptualization of the parliamentary committees as “privileged 
groups”, which are entrusted with specific powers and functions, committees can also 
be seen as being established as a result of division of labor of the legislative workload 
(Mezey, 1979; Strom, 1998, pp. 24-25). Accordingly committees can be considered as 
instruments of economies of operation and they are supposed to increase the efficiency 
of the legislature in at least two ways. First way in which committees can increase the 
efficiency of the legislation is to create “parallel tracks of deliberation” and maximize 
the amount of work that is done through these “parallel channels of deliberation” that 
cannot be practicable when left to floor discussions. The second way in which 
committees can increase the efficiency of the legislation is to provide opportunities for 
the members of the parliament to specialize on a particular policy area because of the 
focused jurisdiction of the committee work (Strom, 1998, pp. 24-25; Khmelko & Wise, 
2010, p. 76).  
As argued by Strom the relationship between committees and the rest of the 
political system can considered to be governed broadly by three characteristics of the 
committee system and therefore literature on legislative committees seems to be 
devoted to these three aspects. According to Strom first characteristic of the committee 
system is structure by which he means ways in which committees are formally 
organized, such as the number of committee members, jurisdictions of the committees 
etc (1998, p. 29). The second characteristic is process by which he means the 
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procedures defining the processes whereby committee‟s are supposed to interfere in the 
legislative and oversighting processes at various levels (p. 39). The third characteristic 
of the committee system is power by which he means various functions of the 
committee that defines committee‟s relationship to the other political actors and defines 
the extent to which committees can have an independent role in legislative process (p. 
47). In this respect when assessing the committee work in terms of the influence it 
exerts on the rest of the political system, it is extremely significant to look at three 
interrelated aspects of the committee with a holistic approach, given that these 
individual characteristics of the committee have important implications for each other. 
Committees are necessitated by the organizational arrangement of the 
legislatures and they become indispensable for democratic legislatures to function 
effectively. However there is significant variation among committees in legislatures of 
different countries with respect to their structure, their functions, the procedures 
governing their internal functioning and their relationship to the rest of the political 
system and etc. In the face of these significant variations, the literature on parliamentary 
committees offers various ways of categorizing individual committee systems of 
different countries. One of the broadest and traditional categorization of committees in 
different legislatures is made on the basis of the extent of power vested in the 
committees in the form of a range of functions (Campbell & Davidson, 1998, pp. 126-
127; Shaw, 1998, p. 227). Accordingly, such a categorization, based on the extent of 
power of committees, establishes a “spectrum” in which “US Congressional 
Committees” and “British Parliamentary Committees” lies at the two poles. In this 
respect US Congressional Committees stands as the strongest committees given the 
extent of their law-making and oversight functions and the extent to which they 
effectively perform these functions compared to committees in different legislatures; 
and British Parliamentary Committees as the weakest because of the limitations that 
exist on the extent to which they can affect a change throughout the legislation process.  
In between these two poles there lie committee systems which constitute a middle 
ground between quite strong committees of the committee-oriented legislative system of 
the United States Congress and the relatively weak committees of the plenary body 
form of the legislature of the British system (Campbell & Davidson, 1998, pp. 126-127; 
Shaw, 1998, p. 227). 
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2.2.2: Institutionalization of Legislatures and Committee Behavior   
The literature on parliamentary committees seems to diverge upon the 
behavioral characteristics of the committees. By behavioral characteristics it is meant 
the overall form that committees‟ actual practice take as a result of the experience that 
committee accumulated throughout time as an institution. Even though there is a 
convergence on the argument that parliamentary committees are established as a result 
of division of labor of the legislative workload; the literature offers three competing 
explanations of committee behavior and a significant number of studies within the 
literature on parliamentary committees have been devoted to finding evidence for which 
behavioral form have greater explanatory power for committees of different legislatures. 
These three behavioral forms, even though they take different names in different 
studies, can be categorized as distributional, informational and partisan models of 
committee behavior. 
Distributional model of committee behavior suggests that committees having 
particular areas of jurisdiction provide a framework on which different committees 
claim leverage with respect to each other over a specific policy area and exchange their 
supports to each other. According to distributional model of committee behavior this 
kind of leverage that individual committees has also provided opportunities for the 
members of the committee to secure some gains for their constituencies by claiming 
“property rights” over a particular policy area and therefore try to maximize the chances 
for their reelection (Campbell & Davidson, 1998, pp. 129-130; Strom, 1998, pp. 25-26; 
Khmelko & Beers, 2011, pp. 503-504; Martorano, 2006, p. 208). 
Informational model of committee behavior suggest that committees maximize 
the information produced about a particular policy area or a bill by providing 
opportunities for the members of the parliament to specialize on a particular policy area 
and by increasing the amount of time that is devoted to a particular policy area or a bill 
through division of labor among different committees. According to informational 
model of committee behavior committees improve both the quantity and quality of the 
knowledge produced within the policy making process; and by distributing this 
knowledge committees also enable other members of the parliament to reflect more on 
various aspects of a bill or a particular policy and therefore committee work produce 
more fruitful floor discussion and improve the quality of the outputs of the legislative 
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work (Campbell & Davidson, 1998, p. 128; Strom, 1998, p. 26; Khmelko & Beers, 
2011, p. 504; Martorano, 2006, p. 208). 
Partisan model of committee behavior suggests that committees are yet another 
arena in which different political parties, both majority and opposition parties, compete 
with each other in order to achieve the outcome through the committee work that is 
most preferred by the party line. According to partisan model of committee behavior 
members of a committee and the political parties they come from stands in a principal-
agent relationship. Accordingly members of a committee, who constitutes the agent part 
of the relationship, are supposed to pursue party line throughout the committee work 
and act in order to realize the goals that political party, who constitutes the principle 
part of the relationship, preferred most Partisan model of committee behavior also 
suggests that committees may become vehicles for the majority party to enhance its 
leadership position in various aspects of legislative work ranging from agenda setting to 
writing legislative proposals. In this respect partisan model of committee behavior 
acknowledges the possibility that executive dominated legislatures go hands in hand 
with strong committees, which are entrusted with significant powers, given that 
committees may form yet another arena in which majority party exert a disproportionate 
influence on the legislative work (Campbell & Davidson, 1998, pp. 128-129; Strom, 
1998, p. 27; Khmelko & Beers, 2011, p. 503; Martorano, 2006, p. 209). 
In the face of these competing explanations of the committee behavior the 
literature on parliamentary committees seem to converge upon the argument that proper 
functioning of a committee system can contribute significantly to the process whereby 
legislature improve its policy making capacity and become more independent of the 
executive influence (Khmelko & Wise, 2010; Olson & Crowther, 2002; Strom, 1998). 
Such a perspective which considers a strong committee system as one of the most 
significant factors that encourage the institutionalization of the legislatures seems to be 
the underlying theme of the studies focusing on committees in developing democracies 
(Khmelko & Wise, 2010; Khmelko & Beer, 2011, p. 501). However, the strength of the 
committee system depends on the actual performance of its individual components and 
how to assess the committees‟ individual performance of fulfilling their functions 
constitutes another body of work in the literature on parliamentary committees.  
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2.3: Assessing Committee Performance 
2.3.1: Conceptual Clarification  
A great deal of study in the literature on parliamentary committees is devoted to 
the question of how to best evaluate the actual performance of the committees in 
fulfilling the functions that they are entrusted with. However, these studies in the 
literature on committees seem to diverge terminologically on the question of which 
concept qualify best to contain comprehensively the meaning of the committee 
performance. The literature on parliamentary committees offers three different concepts 
in this respect. These three different concepts are “committee effectiveness” (Tolley, 
2009; Arter, 2003; Khmelko & Beers, 2011; Rosenthal, 1973); “committee strength” 
(Khmelko, Pigenko & Wise, 2007; Strom, 1998) and “committee influence” 
(Hindmoor, Larkin & Kennon, 2009; Monk, 2012; Kubala, 2011; Khmelko, Wise & 
Brown, 2010). These studies employ different concepts for evaluating the performance 
of the committees; yet they do not seem to diverge systematically upon the question of 
what to look at in order to evaluate best the committee performance.  
Moreover, it seems there is no systematic methodological discussion with 
respect to terminological confusion and therefore there is no well-established 
methodological camps which prefers and encourages one kind of terminology over 
others. Nevertheless there is only a study (Monk, 2010) in which there is a 
methodological discussion on relative appropriateness of the concepts of “committee 
influence” compared to “committee effectiveness” in evaluating the actual performance 
of the committees. In this study it is argued that committees are yet another platform in 
which different political views compete with each other in order to have a greater stake 
in the outcome produced through the committee work. Accordingly, using the concept 
of “committee effectiveness” for evaluating the actual performance of the committees 
would undermine the “political nature of the committees”. It is argued that the concept 
of “committee effectiveness” connote a sense of absolute objectivity which might be 
more appropriate such as with respect to implementation of policies; yet when it comes 
to evaluating committee performance the concept of influence seems to have a 
comparative advantage in terms of capture the “subjectivity” involved in the committee 
work (Monk, 2012, p. 5). 
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Before having a discussion on the different approaches which are developed in 
the literature for measuring committee‟s performance of their assigned functions in the 
following part; it needs to be indicated which concept will be used in this study which 
focuses on Commission on Human Right Inquiry‟s performance of its functions related 
to providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. In analyzing the CoHRI‟s 
performance as a pre-emptive right review mechanism this thesis opts for the concept of 
committee influence instead of committee effectiveness and committee strength within 
the context of Monk‟s (2010) argument on the relative advantage of the concept of 
“committee influence” in capturing the subjectivity involved in committee work. 
 
2.3.2: What to Look at in Evaluating Committee Performance   
The literature on legislative committees contains various perspectives on what to 
look at when evaluating actual performance of the committees. Two different 
methodological trajectories, which are developed to evaluate committee performance, 
can be identified in the literature on parliamentary committees. 
 First methodological trajectory, which is identified in the literature on 
parliamentary committees, can be named as “stakeholders approach”. According to 
“stakeholders approach” best way to evaluate the actual performance of the committees 
is to develop quantitative and qualitative methods in order to reveal the impact of the 
committee work on other groups in the political system which are supposed to interact 
with the legislative committees in performing their own functions. These groups in the 
political system, called by Monk as “relevant groups” (2010, p. 6), can be defined as 
whole actors that can be identified in the political system as likely to have an interest in 
the way that parliamentary committees work; because they are likely to be affected by 
the way committees perform their functions. 
Stakeholders approach seems to be quite dominant in the literature on legislative 
committees for evaluating the performance of the committees in different legislatures. 
Nevertheless, studies which utilize stakeholders approach for evaluating the 
performance of the legislative committees, present differences with respect to the 
comprehensive list of who exactly these relevant groups are. Studies on committee 
performance, which use different sets of stakeholders in order to evaluate the committee 
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performance, do not seem to claim the set that they use is eventual comprehensive list 
of relevant groups; nevertheless it seems there is no consistent use of a particular set of 
stakeholders in studies on committee performance either.  
For instance Monk‟s study, in which he tries to develop a theoretical framework 
for an appropriate evaluation of the committee performance based on a comparative 
analysis of the studies on the subject matter, identifies six groups to look at. He lists 
these groups as government, bureaucracy, parliament, civil society, voters and judiciary 
and he argues that (2010, p. 7) for a more comprehensive understanding of how well a 
committee perform its functions one should look at this list of relevant groups and try to 
develop quantitative or qualitative methods to reveal in what ways these groups are 
affected by the way legislative committees perform their functions. He also 
intentionally removes media, which is perceived as a potential stakeholder in many 
studies on evaluating the performance of committees in different legislatures, from the 
list of relevant groups. He argues that media do not need a  separate treatment as a 
potential group to be affected by the way legislative committees work; because media 
groups have affiliations with specific “interest groups” and a separate treatment of 
media would duplicate the data taken from civil society (2010, p. 6). However, it seems 
he disregards the capacity of the media in increasing the awareness of the committee 
work in one way or another depending on the ideological position it has; which 
constitutes the reason why some studies on committee performance perceive media a 
potential stake holder. 
Another study by Khmelko, Wise and Brown uses again members of the 
parliament in order to evaluate committee performance in Ukrainian parliament. In this 
study Khmelko, Wise and Brown underlines the significance of the committees in 
empowering the process of legislative institutionalization (2010, p. 72). In this regard 
they define the committee influence as the extent to which committees provide the 
parliament with the information that it needs to develop itself as an independent policy 
actor free from the disproportionate influence of the executive (pp. 74-75 and p. 76). In 
order to measure committee influence in the form of providing the parliament with a 
source of information, free from government influence, they make a statistical analysis 
as to which among the two, whether “ministerial drafts” or “committee 
recommendations” on legislation proposals has a greater explanatory power, if any, of 
the resultant plenary voting in the parliament (pp. 80-83). 
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Another study by Hindmoor, Larkin and Kennon, which is intended to evaluate 
the performance of The Education and Skills Committee in UK, identifies government, 
parliament, media and political parties as the potential stakeholders (2009, pp. 74-75). 
They also list the civil society as a potential stakeholder but they do not include this 
group in their study because they argue this would be beyond the scope of their study 
(p. 75). In this regard they define committee influence as the extent to which a 
committee is able to hold the legislation of executive origin in check and to provide a 
source of information which is free from disproportionate executive influence (p. 71). 
For measuring the committee influence on government they make a twofold analysis. 
Firstly they look at the responses of government to the reports of the committee 
between the years 1997 and 2005 and they classify the government responses into five 
categories ranging from “agreeing with the committee‟s recommendation” to 
“specifically rejecting it” (p. 76). Secondly they compare the committee‟s 
recommendations with the content of the eventual legislative outcome in order to have a 
conclusion on whether government responses are realized or not (p. 77). For measuring 
the committee influence on the parliament they look at the number of times a reference 
is made to the committee‟s reports in the plenary debates on the legislative proposals 
which constitute the subject of analysis of committee‟s influence on government. They 
additionally look at the number of times members of the committee speak in the plenary 
debate for seeking influence (p. 82). For measuring the committee influence on media 
they simply look at the media coverage of the committee work in years between 1997 
and 2005 (p. 82). Finally for measuring the committee influence on political parties they 
just rely on 13 interviews that they make with the members of the committee and civil 
servants (p. 85).  
Another study by Monk focuses on government as the potential stakeholder in 
order to evaluate the performance of the committees in the Australian parliament. Monk 
employs the concept of influence as the capacity of the committee work to change 
government action. In this regard Monk analyzes how government responds to the 
committee recommendations on legislation proposals in order to arrive at a conclusion 
as to the extent of committee influence in the Australian parliament. He also make an 
analysis on the committee reports which are able to change the government action in 
one way or another in order to reveal what kind of committee reports has the greatest 
chance of changing the government action (2012, p. 138). In this regard he also analyze 
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the media coverage of committee work as a potential factor which increase the chances 
for a committee report to shape the executive action and underline the significance of 
the media as a potential stakeholder in committee‟s work in terms of increasing the 
awareness of the committee work in public space (pp. 148-149). 
Another study by Tolley which is intended to evaluating the performance of the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights in UK focuses on government, parliament and the 
judiciary as the potential stakeholders (2009, pp. 48-50). In this regard they offer 
various quantitative and qualitative methods. Tolley defines the committee influence as 
again the capacity of the committees to provide a source of information that is free from 
disproportionate executive influence (p. 47). In this regard for measuring the committee 
influence on government Tolley relies on existing works such as Klug and Powell‟s 
works on whether JCHR‟s recommendations are able to affect a change in the eventual 
legislative outcome of executive origin or not (pp. 48-49). For measuring the committee 
influence on the parliament Tolley relies on existing works such as Smookler and Klug 
in which an analysis of the number of times the reports of the committee is cited in the 
plenary meetings is made (pp. 47-48). For measuring the committee influence on the 
judiciary Tolley looks at the number of times the reports of the JCHR is cited in the 
judiciary decisions (p. 50).  
Another study by Kubala which is intended to evaluating the performance of the 
Select Committees in UK focuses on media. Kubala defines committee influence as the 
capacity of the committee work to change/shape government action. In this regard 
Kubala underlines the importance of media coverage of the committee work in terms of 
enhancing the leverage that committees have with respect to the government. She 
argues that by increasing the awareness of the committee work in public space media 
coverage of the committee work would increase the “pressure on the executive to take 
action” (2011, pp. 699-700). In this regard she makes an analysis on the media coverage 
of the committee work in order to reveal the trends, if any, on which committees have 
the greatest coverage and which aspects of the committee work has the highest chance 
of getting covered in the media (pp. 700-701). 
The second methodological trajectory, which is identified in the literature on 
legislative committees, can be named as the “institutional approach”. According to the 
“institutional approach” the best way to evaluate the actual performance of the 
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committees is to make an analysis on the institutional rules and procedures which are 
supposed to govern not only the inner workings of the legislative committees but also 
govern the relationship between legislative committees and other actors in the political 
system. Institutional rules and procedures are considered to have a significant role in the 
resultant performance of the committees. This is so because according to the 
institutional approach these institutional rules and procedures are among the most 
important factors which shape the structure, process and powers of these committees, 
three characteristic of the committee system that are perceived as governing the 
relationship between committees and the rest of the political system. 
An example of the studies in the literature on legislative committees which 
employs institutional approach would be a study by Khmelko, Pigenko and Wise. In this 
study they try to explain the factors for weaknesses or strength of the parliamentary 
committees in the Ukrainian parliament. Khmelko, Pigenko and Wise similar to the 
study by Khmelko, Wise and Brown underline the significance of the committees in 
empowering the process of legislative institutionalization (2007, p. 211). In this regard 
they define the committee strength as the extent to which committees provide the 
parliament with the information that it needs to develop itself as an independent policy 
actor free from the disproportionate influence of the executive (pp. 211-212). In 
accordance with the institutional approach that they adopt in their study, to measure 
committee strength in the form of providing the parliament with an independent source 
of information they discuss the significance of three institutional factors (p. 212). These 
institutional factors are suggested as the presidential versus the parliamentary regime 
types; features of the party systems such as the level of party discipline or ideological 
distance of the different parties; the quality of the staff who are employed in committees 
(pp. 212-215). In this regard, based on a survey of the members of the parliament, they 
try to find out whether the qualitative evidence supports the institutional explanations of 
the committee strength, defined as the capacity of the parliamentary committees to 
provide the parliament with a source of information, free from government influence; 
and whether any additional factors such as non-formal rules and attitudes that members 
of the parliament adopt have an influence on the level of strength that parliamentary 
committees has (p. 218). 
Another study by Arter, which employs institutional approach, is also a 
significant example in studies on committee performance. In this study Arter defines 
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committee strength as the level of cohesion that the committee has; and by committee 
cohesion he means the extent to which the members of the committee identify 
themselves with the committee. In other words committee cohesion is defined by Arter 
as the extent to which a particular committee develop an identity of its own which in 
turn empower the capacity of the parliamentary committee to become an independent 
policy maker mechanism free from the disproportionate influence of the executive 
(2003, p. 74). With such a definition of committee effectiveness Arter tries to underline 
the overemphasis which is made on the definition of committees as another platform for 
the resolution of political conflicts and divisions. In this regard contrary to the existing 
tendency in the literature on legislative committees to relate committees with divisions, 
Arter tries to introduce a new approach by assuming “a significant degree of unity” in 
committees (pp. 73-74). In line with the institutional approach that he employs, he then 
discuss several institutional rules and procedures such as “committee membership 
incumbency”; “committee member expertise”; “the size of the committee”; the extent of 
the committee issue valence”; “the level of party system cohesion”; and most 
importantly “the right of the committees to initiate legislation” as the relevant factors 
influencing the committee effectiveness defined as the level of committee cohesion (pp. 
76-77 and p.79). 
Another study by Martorano, which intends to find out which among the three 
competing explanations of committee behavior, namely informational, distributional 
and partisan, is supported by the empirical evidence on American States (2006, p. 206). 
Martorano defines committee strength as the level of autonomy that the committees 
have with respect to being an independent policy maker actor. In this regard Martorano, 
builds upon Rosenthal‟s (1973) definition of which characteristics that an autonomous 
committee has, namely “the right to review legislation”; “the right to screen 
legislation”; “the right to shape the nature of legislation”; “the right to affect the passage 
of legislation”. In accordance with the institutional approach Martorano adopts; he 
makes an analysis on the institutional rules and procedures which increase the level of 
autonomy that a committee has by the empowering the dimensions that Rosenthal‟s 
definition suggests (pp. 216-217). In this regard Martorano argues that these three 
competing explanations of committee behavior predicts different levels of committee 
system autonomy; distributional model being the most demanding model of committee 
autonomy and partisan model is the least demanding one. Accordingly she argues that 
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one of the best ways to compare these alternative explanations on the basis of 
committee system autonomy (pp. 208-209). 
After reviewing the institutional and stakeholders approaches in the literature on 
how to assess committee work, it needs to be underlined that these two different 
approaches seem to converge upon the significance of qualitative methods in assessing 
the committee work. Kubala (2011); Arter (2003); Khmelko and Beers (2011); 
Khmelko Pigenko and Wise (2007); Hindmoor, Larkin and Kennon (2009) utilizes 
qualitative methods in their study. Moreover, Monk tries to develop a theoretical 
framework for an appropriate evaluation of the committee performance, underlines the 
importance of the qualitative methods in revealing the political nature of the committee 
work (2010, pp. 5-6). In addition to Monk; Evans and Evans also emphasize the 
significance of qualitative methods for evaluating the performance of different human 
rights protection mechanisms at parliamentary level in revealing a picture that is beyond 
the formal description rules and principles and  providing a deeper understanding (2006, 
p. 564).  
At this point it is important to underline another study which is made by Evans 
and Evans (2006) with the intention of filling the gap in the literature on human rights 
protection mechanisms in terms of setting a valid methodological framework for the 
“evaluation of the performance of the legislatures in protecting human rights” in the 
legislation making process (p. 546 and p. 548). In this study Evans and Evans aim to 
propose a methodological track for assessing the legislature‟s performance of their 
human rights protection function in the legislative process. In this regard they indicate 
that the methodology that they propose would specifically focus on the legislature‟s 
human rights review function in the very policy making process and on the pre-emptive 
role of legislatures (p. 548). They argue that such a methodological framework needs to 
acknowledge the disagreements about both the content and scope of the human rights 
and to be complex enough to grasp the complexity of legislative organization and policy 
making process (p. 549). 
Evans and Evans argue that in order to reveal the impact of mechanisms of 
human rights protection on the way different actors in the political system approach 
human rights issues in performing their own functions more comprehensively, the aim 
of the methodology needs to be twofold. Firstly, the methodology needs to aim at 
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revealing the concrete positive outcomes gained through mechanisms of human rights 
protection. Secondly, the methodology also needs to aim at revealing the contribution of 
various human rights protection mechanisms to the process of policy making in terms of 
integrating further human rights perspectives in the policy making process. In this 
regard they emphasize that the “process” aspect of the methodology need to be able to 
reveal the capacity of different human rights protection mechanisms firstly to identify 
legislative proposals that might raise human rights concerns and secondly to increase 
the place of human rights considerations in the deliberative processes (pp. 551-552).  
First component of the methodology that Evans and Evans develop is called 
“process-mapping”. By “process-mapping” they mean a descriptive analysis of various 
official documents ranging from standing orders to laws in order to reveal the rules, 
principles, procedures which govern not only the inner workings of the different 
mechanisms that are involved in the processes of human rights review but also govern 
the relationship of these mechanisms to the other actors in the political system (p. 563). 
In this regard the first component of the methodology that they offer connects to the 
institutional approach in the literature on how to assess committee work in emphasizing 
the significance of formal institutional rules and procedures in shaping the powers of the 
different mechanisms and therefore their resultant performance of the human rights 
protection function.  
The second component of the methodology that Evans and Evans offer is called 
“Impact Analysis”. By “Impact Analysis” they mean an analysis on the influence that 
the work of different mechanisms of human rights protection operating at legislative 
level have on the other actors in the political system. They emphasize that such an 
analysis would back up the descriptive analysis of formal rules, principles and 
procedures governing the functioning of mechanisms of human rights protection by 
being closer to an “independent” evaluation of the impact of these mechanisms on the 
overall capacity of the legislation to human rights scrutiny in the legislative process (p. 
564). In this regard the second component of the methodology that they offer connects 
to the stakeholders approach in the literature on how to assess committee work. This is 
so; because they emphasize the significance of revealing the impact of mechanisms of 
human rights protection on the way different actors in the political system approach 
human rights issues in performing their own functions in understanding the performance 
of the different human rights protection mechanisms. 
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The methodological approach that Evans and Evans develop seems to be more 
relevant for the purposes of this thesis because their methodology relates to different 
methodological approaches existing in the literature on how to assess parliamentary 
committees‟ work. In this regard inclusion of the Evans and Evans‟s study into the 
relevant works that this thesis‟s methodology relies upon is significant. This is so; 
because it would not only make the analysis in this thesis connected within a larger 
literature on human rights protection mechanism; but also would combine different 
approaches existing in the literature on how to assess committee work. The 
methodological approach they develop for assessing the overall performance of 
legislatures in terms of human rights protection function can also be applied to the 
assessment of performance of the individual mechanisms such as committees on human 
rights, which legislature has, of the same function. So Evans and Evans‟s 
methodological framework would subsume two different dimensions of the focus of this 
thesis, CoHRI, which are respectively its being a parliamentary commission and its 
being pre-emptive right review mechanism.  
 
2.4: Turkey’s Place within the Theoretical Framework and Works on 
Parliamentary Commissions in Turkey 
 
In order to understand Turkey‟s place within the context of the latest struggle 
which has been started on the part of the legislature to reclaim its share in ensuring the 
superiority of the constitution and constitutional rights, an insight into the transitions 
that country undertook with respect to the constitutionalism is needed. In this regard the 
place of Turkey within the theoretical framework, which is set above, needs to be 
discussed historically and this will be done in the following paragraphs.  
The 1924 Constitution, which constitutes the first constitution of Turkish 
Republic, gives the executive and legislative power to the Grand National Assembly 
and it opts for the fusion of powers (1924 Constitution, 5
th
 Article). In this regard, the 
1924 constitution seems to make the principle of parliamentary sovereignty main 
character defining the new Turkish Republic. The 1924 Constitution, lasting until the 
1960 military coup d‟état, recognizes the Assembly (Meclis) as the supreme decision 
making body, comprising of both the executive and legislative bodies, and does not 
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recognize any supreme authority to review the compatibility of the Assembly‟s 
decisions with the Constitution. In this regard the period between 1924 and 1960 can be 
seen as a phase in which the responsibility of ensuring the effective protection of 
fundamental rights, which are enlisted in the constitution and do not include social and 
economic rights, is mainly delegated to the Assembly without having a constitutional 
court reviewing the executive and legislative acts.  
However, the 1961 Constitution can be seen as a turning point for the 
constitutional regime in Turkey in the sense that it adopts the principle of separation of 
powers. The 1961 Constitution is formulated with the intention of addressing the 
deficiencies of the political system which are accused of providing a framework for 
establishing a form of authoritarianism. Within the context of introducing mechanisms 
which would mitigate authoritarian tendencies in the political system, the Constitutional 
Court was established as an institution which reviews the compatibility of the legislative 
and executive acts with the Constitution that also includes this time social and economic 
rights as well (1961 Constitution, Article 147). The 1961 Constitution, lasting until the 
1980 military coup d‟état, seems to make Turkey more in line with the trends that world 
undertakes succeeding the World War II with respect to protection of constitutional 
rights in the form of adopting the essentials of the American model of judiciary-based 
constitutionalism. Turkey in this period adopted similar principles by establishing a 
constitutional court and entrust it with the main responsibility of ensuring the 
compatibility of the legislative and executive acts with the fundamental rights as a 
necessary measure preventive of authoritarian governments. Since then, the 
Constitutional Court of Turkey maintained its exclusive role in ensuring the superiority 
of the constitution and the compatibility of the legislative and executive acts with 
fundamental rights; even though in 1982 a new constitution was introduced and a 
number changes have been made into the constitution since then.  
So currently, the place of Turkey within this theoretical framework seems to be 
closer to the predominant model of judiciary – based constitutionalism, given that 
Constitutional Court of Turkey (AYM) is the authoritative decision-maker with respect 
to providing resolutions of issues involving right conflicts (The Constitution of Turkey, 
Article 148 and Article 153). In this respect, judicial review by constitutional court in 
the Turkish case constitutes a practical implication of judiciary-based model of 
constitutionalism; because the practice emphasizes legal interpretation of fundamental 
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citizen rights and gives a primary role to constitutional court in checking the legislative 
and executive outcomes‟ compatibility with fundamental rights and freedoms. Yet the 
AYM is not the only institutional mechanism which is established for an effective right 
review in the society. Aside from the judiciary there are also institutional arrangements, 
established at both executive and legislative levels for human rights protection. Even 
though these institutions do not have a right to pronounce a disagreement with the 
decisions of the AYM; they function as a mechanism for reviewing the compatibility of 
legislative proposals with constitutional rights and for preventing any rights violation 
from occurring in the first place in the policy making process. Given that the aim of this 
thesis is to inquire into the location of Turkey within the context of the recent struggle 
which has been started on the part of the legislature to reclaim its share in ensuring the 
superiority of the constitution and constitutional rights; I will specifically focus on 
Commission on Human Rights Inquiry (CoHRI) as it is the first national human rights 
protection mechanism established in Turkey operating at the parliamentary level. In this 
sense, I will make a descriptive analysis of the CoHRI‟s performance of its functions 
that are related to providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. 
I expect my descriptive analysis of the CoHRI‟s performance of its functions 
that are related to providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism to yield that CoHRI 
has relatively limited influence in terms of both affecting a change throughout the 
legislation process and oversighting the government from a human rights perspective. In 
this regard this thesis has two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis I: The legal status of the CoHRI decreases the level of influence 
CoHRI has in terms of providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism.  
Hypothesis I, defined above, relates to the institutional approach in the literature 
on how to measure committee performance which underlines the significance of formal 
rules and procedures that are related both to the inner functioning of the legislative 
committees and to their relation to other actors in the political system. In the context of 
institutional approach the Hypothesis I states that the legal status of the CoHRI, which 
results from the formal rules and regulations on legislative commissions generally and 
on CoHRI particularly, decreases the level of influence CoHRI has in terms of 
providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. In this regard I expect that the rules 
and regulations which form the status of the CoHRI to render the level of influence 
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CoHRI has in providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism weaker in the form of 
both affecting a change throughout the legislation process and oversighting the 
government from a human rights perspective. 
Hypothesis II: The functioning of TBMM as a plenary body form of legislature 
decreases the level of influence CoHRI has in terms of providing a pre-emptive right 
review mechanism. 
One of the broadest and traditional categorization of committees in different 
legislatures is made on the basis of the extent of power vested in the committees by the 
very design of the legislative process (Campbell & Davidson, 1998, pp. 126-127; Shaw, 
1998, p. 227). Accordingly, if committee power is considered as a spectrum quite strong 
committees of the committee-oriented legislative system of the United States Congress 
and the relatively weak committees of the plenary body form of the legislature of the 
British system Legislatures lies at the two poles and in between there lie committee 
systems which constitute a middle ground between these two poles (Campbell & 
Davidson, 1998, pp. 126-127; Shaw, 1998, p. 227). In this context the Hypothesis II 
states that the functioning of TBMM as a plenary body form of legislature decreases the 
level of influence CoHRI has in terms of providing a pre-emptive right review 
mechanism. In this regard I expect characteristics of legislative process which are 
associated with legislatures functioning as a plenary body to render the level of 
influence CoHRI has in providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism weaker in the 
form of both affecting a change throughout the legislation process and oversighting the 
government from a human rights perspective. 
After formulating the aim of the thesis and hypotheses, in the following 
paragraphs I will introduce the works on parliamentary commissions in Turkey with a 
specific focus on how this thesis is different from these studies and in what ways it 
makes a contribution. The literature on parliamentary commissions in Turkey can 
argued to be quite limited both in its quantity and its scope. There are only two studies 
which are devoted to parliamentary commissions in Turkey. These two studies are 
“Commissions in Legislative Assembly” by Tuncer Karamustafaoğlu and 
“Parliamentary Scrutiny of Human Rights” by İzzet Eroğlu.  
The study by Karamustafaoğlu (1965) is intended to review different committee 
systems globally and then try to put Turkish commission system into the context of this 
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discussion in a comparative perspective. After having a brief discussion on the history 
of parliamentary committees both in the global context and in Turkey he argues that the 
committee systems of different countries present various differences with respect to 
their functions, their organizational structure, their issue valence and etc. Even though 
he underlines the significance of political culture and political history for the emergence 
of these differences, he seems to adopt an institutional approach in making this 
argument. Accordingly he emphasizes the significance of the institutional rules and 
procedures which are supposed to govern not only the inner working of the legislative 
committees but also govern the relationship between legislative committees and other 
actors in the political system (p. 66) He devotes a whole chapter (Chapter 6) to review 
different institutional rules and procedures in a global context as one of the most 
significant factors which shape the structure, process and powers of the legislative 
committees and therefore constitutes the main source for the existence of emerging 
differences among the committee systems of different countries.  
Nevertheless, he argues that two different committee systems can be identified 
in the face of the various differences which committees in different countries present. 
Accordingly he proposes “specialized committee systems” and “non-specialized 
committee systems” as two general categories under which different committee systems 
can be subsumed (pp. 66-67). According to Karamustafaoğlu these two committee 
systems are exercised most purely by United States of America and by United Kingdom 
respectively (pp. 66-67).  
In differentiating between “specialized committee systems” and “non-
specialized committee systems” Karamustafaoğlu suggests the criterion of whether 
standing committees are formally assigned with specific policy areas (p. 67, p. 69 and p. 
76). Accordingly “specialized committee systems” have standing committees which are 
entrusted with specific policy areas and this is why they are generally established in 
parallel to ministerial organization. In “specialized committee systems” committees 
work on the basis of cumulative experience that they have as a result of specializing on 
a specific policy area. The fact that each committee is specialized in a specific policy 
area also makes them to review legislative proposals before these proposals come to the 
floor for general discussion and offer significant changes with respect to the essence of 
the legislative proposals (pp. 76-77). On the other hand “non-specialized committee 
systems” might have standing committees; nevertheless these committees are not 
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assigned with specific policy areas. This is why the legislative proposals can only be 
reviewed by the standing committees after it is discussed and settled out with respect to 
its essence in the plenary session. This situation also makes standing committees in 
“non-specialized committee systems” weaker compared to the standing committees in 
“specialized committee systems” in terms of the scope of change that committee work 
can effect on the essence of the legislative proposals (pp. 69-70).  
However the relevance of the study by Karamustafaoğlu for the purposes of this 
thesis is quite limited given the fact that it is a study made in the 1960s. Since the 1960s 
there had been a lot of changes and transformations happened in various aspects of the 
Turkish society including the constitution and political system.  
A more up to date study is made by İzzet Eroğlu (2007) and this study is much 
more relevant for the purposes of this thesis given the fact that it focuses on the activity 
of different mechanisms at the parliamentary level, including the Commission on 
Human Rights Inquiry, in terms of their capacity to protect human rights at the level of 
parliament (pp. 2-3). His study can be considered as a descriptive study; because it is 
only intended to give a descriptive analysis of the activity of the various mechanisms at 
the parliamentary level in terms of their human rights protection function. 
Eroğlu lists oral and written questions; plenary discussions; parliamentary 
inquiry; parliamentary investigation; interpellation as traditional mechanisms of human 
rights protection at the parliamentary level (p. 143) and he gives a descriptive analysis 
of each of them with respect to their performance of human rights protection function 
covering the years between 1991 and 2007. Subsequently he makes a separate and more 
detailed descriptive analysis of CoHRI‟s human rights monitoring functions. 
In this regard he focuses on CoHRI‟s investigatory sub-commission works and 
individual petitions which are appealed to the CoHRI. Regarding the sub-commission 
works Eroğlu firstly categorizes human rights issues involved in sub-commission works 
between the years 1991 and 2007. Then he presents percentage of the sub-commission 
reports which become commission report for each human rights category (pp. 262-264). 
However it seems Eroğlu‟s analysis seems to lack a discussion on the relationship 
between investigatory reports and plenary meetings. Such an analysis would be 
important; because the reports prepared as a result of investigatory work of the CoHRI 
have a significant deal of leverage vis-à-vis the government and have an important 
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capacity to stimulate a reaction on the part of the government through creating pressure 
on the executive by stimulating discussion in the General Assembly. Secondly, he looks 
at individual appeals to the Commission on Human Rights Inquiry in the form of 
petitions, which the Commission is entitled to refer to the concerned government 
departments in case of a human rights violation (pp. 361-362). He makes a descriptive 
analysis of the petitions referred to the Commission on Human Rights Inquiry by 
looking firstly at the distribution of the number of the appeals over the years and 
secondly at the subject matter of the human rights issue involved over the years (pp. 
362-364 and p.365). 
Eroğlu also touches upon the effectiveness of the Commission on Human Rights 
Inquiry in his study. In this regard he argues that one of the most significant obstacles to 
the effectiveness of the Commission is the lack of competencies which the CoHRI is 
entrusted with. Eroğlu argues that since the CoHRI lacks an adequate level of 
competency towards the executive; the activity of the CoHRI is prone to 
inconsequential in terms of obtaining concrete results apart from shaping public opinion 
(pp. 421-422). In this regard he emphasizes that the CoHRI is unable to prosecute the 
post-treatment of its reports by the concerned departments of the executive without 
having an adequate level of obligatory power (p. 437). Moreover in connection with 
that, he also argues the CoHRI is not able to make effective follow-ups of the petitions, 
which it refers to concerned executive departments. In this regard he proposes that 
CoHRI needs to have the authority to refer instances of human rights violation to the 
judiciary directly (p. 425 and p. 438). Eroğlu‟s discussion on the effectiveness of the 
CoHRI in fulfilling its monitoring and investigatory functions presents a very promising 
starting point; however one of the most important shortcomings of his discussion is the 
lack of a methodological framework on the basis of which an appropriate assessment of 
the performance of CoHRI‟s monitoring and investigatory functions can be made. The 
absence of a methodological framework makes his study on the CoHRI‟s monitoring 
and investigatory functions disconnected from a broader literature on parliamentary 
commissions as to how to assess the commission work. The lack of impact analysis with 
respect to revealing the relationship between the investigatory reports of the 
commission and the plenary meetings seem to be resulting from his study‟s 
disconnectedness from the wider literature on how to assess commission work.  
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Eroğlu‟s work on parliamentary mechanisms for human rights scrutiny presents 
a detailed analysis of the CoHRI‟s investigatory and monitoring functions by providing 
a description of CoHRI‟s investigatory reports and CoHRI‟s work on petitions referred 
to the commission. As argued earlier CoHRI‟s functions, which are related to providing 
a pre-emptive right review mechanism, have been actively performed by the CoHRI 
since 2011. As argued by Eroğlu (p. 437) even though there is no legal infringement 
before the assignment of the legislative proposals, which are within the jurisdiction of 
the CoHRI, by the Office of the Speaker to the CoHRI it seems as if there is no 
legislative proposal assigned to CoHRI until 2011 when a legal change put into effect 
with regards to CoHRI‟s review function. After such a legal change the reviewing 
legislative proposals is added as a legally recognized function, a function which has 
already existed according to the articles of the internal rulings of the TBMM concerning 
the parliamentary commissions, into the duties of the CoHRI section in the commission 
law. So, the functions of CoHRI that are related to providing a pre-emptive right review 
mechanism seem to be under-studied and this thesis intends to contribute to fill this gap 
by making a descriptive analysis of the CoHRI‟s performance of its functions that are 
related to providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. 
Having introduced the works on parliamentary commissions in Turkey, in the 
next chapter I will define the methodology which is used in order to test the two 
hypotheses of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 3  
METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
3.1: Methodology 
In this part I will introduce the methodology that is adopted by this thesis to 
make a descriptive analysis of the CoHRI‟s performance of its functions that are related 
to providing a pre-emptive right review. As argued earlier, in analyzing the CoHRI‟s 
performance of these functions, this thesis opts for the concept of committee influence 
instead of committee effectiveness. This is so; not only because concept of committee 
influence is better in capturing the subjectivity involved in committee work as argued 
by Monk (2010); but also because the functions of the CoHRI, that constitutes the focus 
of this thesis‟s analysis, are relatively new ones. Given that the CoHRI‟s functions, 
which are related to providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism, have been 
actively performed by the CoHRI since 2011, the data that will be used in the analysis 
will be quite limited. In this regard if the limits on the amount of data and on reaching 
general conclusions on the CoHRI‟s performance is considered; preferring the concept 
of the committee influence will be more in line with the purposes of this thesis in terms 
of capturing the descriptive nature of this study. 
First component of the methodology is “process-mapping”. Process mapping 
component of the methodology connects the thesis to the institutional approach in the 
literature on how to assess committee work which emphasize the significance of formal 
institutional rules and procedures in shaping the powers of the different mechanisms 
and therefore their resultant performance of the human rights protection function. In 
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process mapping I will look at how the rules governing both the inner functioning of 
CoHRI and its relation to the overall law making process in the legislature is laid out in 
various official documents. In this regard I will firstly look at how rules, principles, 
procedures shape the structure of the commission; and secondly how these rules shape 
the relationship of the commission to the overall legislation making process in the 
legislature and thirdly how these rules lay down the functions and powers of the 
commission vis-à-vis other actors in the political system.  
The second component of the methodology is “Impact Analysis”. Impact 
analysis component of the methodology connects this thesis to the stakeholders 
approach in the literature on how to assess committee work which emphasize the 
significance of revealing the impact of mechanisms of human rights protection on the 
way different actors in the political system approach human rights issues in performing 
their own functions in understanding the performance of the different human rights 
protection mechanisms. In impact analysis this thesis will focus on government and 
legislature as two relevant groups. In order to make an analysis on the impact of the 
CoHRI on the government I will analyze whether review function of Commission on 
Human Rights Inquiry is able to affect a change on the eventual legislative outcome of 
executive origin. In this regard I will firstly look at the number of times legislative 
reports of the CoHRI is able to make an amendment on legislative proposals of 
executive origin in line with its recommendations.  
However it might not be possible to make a completely similar analysis to 
Hindmoor, Larkin and Kennon (2009) and Monk (2012), who make a similar impact 
analysis on the basis of official government responses to the committee 
recommendations, in the context of Turkey. This is so because in Turkey government is 
not enforced to give direct responses to the recommendations of the commission reports 
as this is the case in countries that Hindmoor and Monk studied. However it is still 
possible to trace the impact of the commission work on the eventual legislative outcome 
of government origin in the case of Turkey. In this regard it is important to underline 
that there are basically two channels available for the commission to affect a change on 
the legislative proposal of government origin in line with the human right concerns that 
it identifies. First channel is the commission meeting itself in which generally 
negotiations take place with the representative(s) of the government who had proposed 
the original legislative draft. So, these negotiations might result in the acceptance by the 
 34 
 
representative(s) of the recommendations offered by the commission with respect to 
compatibility of the proposal in question with the human rights. Second channel is 
plenary meetings in which the legislative reports of the commission are read before the 
whole members of the assembly and the government. The recommendations of the 
legislative reports of the commission can affect a change on the eventual legislative 
outcome of government origin through stimulating debate on the proposal and 
influencing the plenary voting. Moreover in tracing the impact of the commission work 
on the eventual legislative outcome of government origin, it is still possible to use a 
scale similar to Hindmoor and Monk in order to make a more systematic evaluation of 
the commission‟s influence on the government. In this regard similar to the approach 
adopted by Hindmoor and Monk this thesis will also utilize a scale of government 
acceptance of the commission‟s recommendation in analyzing the commission‟s impact 
on the government. 
The investigatory functions of the CoHRI also have a significant capacity to 
change the way government approach human rights issues in performing their own 
functions. In this regard the reports prepared as a result of investigatory work of the 
CoHRI have a significant deal of leverage vis-à-vis the government and have an 
important capacity to stimulate a reaction on the part of the government through 
creating pressure on the executive despite fact that the suggestions on these reports for 
the betterment of the implementations of the human rights law are not binding on the 
government.  
Besides, as argued by Eroğlu (2007, p. 437) even though there is no legal 
infringement before the assignment of the legislative proposals, which are within the 
jurisdiction of the CoHRI, by the Office of the Speaker to the CoHRI it seems there is 
no legislative proposal assigned to CoHRI until 2011 when a legal change put into 
effect with regards to CoHRI‟s review function. In this regard until 2011 the work of 
the CoHRI is overwhelmingly composed of its investigatory functions. 
Given such a significant capacity of the investigatory work of the CoHRI to 
stimulate a reaction on the part of the executive and relatively greater space occupied by 
the investigatory work of the CoHRI within the overall functions of the commission; not 
including the investigatory work of the CoHRI in the first component of my impact 
analysis needs justification. The reason why I will not be able to look at the 
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investigatory functions of the CoHRI in the first component of the impact analysis is 
threefold. Firstly establishing a connection between the suggestions in the investigatory 
reports of the CoHRI and subsequent government action is a theoretically problematic 
task. This is so because even though the suggestions in the investigatory reports of the 
CoHRI mainly identify many inadequacies and wrongdoings in the implementation of 
human rights law and points out the necessary adjustments, it is not possible to make a 
causal connection between government actions and the suggestions of the investigatory 
reports. For example let us say subsequent to CoHRI published a   report based on its 
investigation of a particular jail in which it is stated that the capacity of the jail is far 
more exceeded, government issues an amnesty plan. However it is theoretically 
problematic to argue that the investigatory report of the CoHRI is what stimulated the 
government to take such an action and therefore to argue that the investigatory work of 
the CoHRI had an impact on the overall legislative outcome. Moreover besides the 
investigatory reports of the CoHRI the very act of investigation by the CoHRI might 
from time to time cause the government to make ad-hoc adjustments before they publish 
a report on their investigation. However it is not possible to study these kinds of ad-hoc 
adjustments in this study given that these kinds of acts are prepared behind closed doors 
and the deliberations do not get to be recorded. 
Secondly, my thesis is located theoretically within the framework of the new 
approaches to human rights protection which was brought about by the discussions on 
alternative models of constitutionalism (Hiebert, 2006a, p. 5). In this regard for the 
purposes of my study the legislative functions of the CoHRI is relatively more relevant 
compared to the its investigatory functions given that the focus of the new approaches 
to projection of rights is to increase the amount of reflection from a rights perspective in 
the policy making process by foreseeing the inclusion of institutional actors, other than 
the judiciary in the responsibility of ensuring the compatibility of state‟s action with 
individual rights (Hiebert, 2006a, pp. 35-36). In this regard for the purposes of my study 
giving an emphasis on legislative functions of the CoHRI in the first component of the 
impact analysis is justifiable given that the interest of this study is mainly on capacity of 
the CoHRI in terms of providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism besides judicial 
review of legislative and executive acts.   
Thirdly the activity reports of the CoHRI were not published between 2002 and 
2007 due to lack of staff and given that investigatory reports can only be reached 
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through these reports such a gap, which corresponds approximately to the one fourth of 
its overall activity, would distort the consequences drawn from such an analysis of the 
investigatory reports in the first component of the impact analysis.  
Nevertheless it may still seem to be problematic to remove the investigatory 
reports from the analysis which will be made in the first component of the impact 
analysis. However I expect to compensate for this in the second component of the 
impact analysis by making an analysis of the relationship between the investigatory 
reports and the plenary meetings. In this regard I will look at the number of times the 
references are being made either to the investigatory or legislative reports of the CoHRI 
in plenary discussions in order to reveal the impact of both investigatory and legislative 
functions of the CoHRI in terms of stimulate deliberative discussions on human rights 
issues in the plenary meetings. As a complementary analysis I will also look at how 
human rights focus of the oral questions, which is one of the most significant scrutiny 
mechanisms of the parliament, change across the time when CoHRI have been 
functioning. In this regard I will also try to inquire into whether the legal change, which 
adds review function to the duties of CoHRI in Act 3686 in 2011, has an impact on the 
human rights focus of the oral questions. I believe the second component of my impact 
analysis will compensate for the removal of the investigatory reports from the analysis 
in the first part; because as argued by Evans and Evans in revealing the impact of 
mechanisms of human rights protection on the way different actors in the political 
system approach human rights issues; it is also important to look at how these 
mechanisms influence the process of policy making in addition to concrete positive 
outcomes which are gained because of the work of these mechanisms of human rights 
review.  
Moreover, given the emphasis on qualitative methods in both literature on how 
to assess committee work and the literature on parliamentary human rights protection 
mechanisms; this thesis also utilizes qualitative interviewing in order to back up the 
analysis on CoHRI‟s legislative and investigatory reports. In this regard in order to have 
a deeper understanding the influence of the CoHRI on government and on parliament I 
will also rely on the in-depth interviews that I conducted with five bureaucrats and three 
members of the TBMM who worked in the CoHRI.  
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3.2: Data Analysis 
3.2.1: Process Mapping 
The Commission on Human Rights Inquiry is different from other commissions 
in the parliament by being established by law alongside with the Commission on Equal 
Opportunity for Women and Men, the Commission on EU Harmonization, the 
Commission on Petitions and the Commission on State Economic Enterprise 
(Neziroğlu, Kocaman & Gökçimen, 2011, p. 44). In this regard in order to make a 
process-mapping analysis, which is intended to describe official rules and principles, 
governing both the inner functioning of CoHRI and its relation to the legislative 
process, I will mainly look at the Act 3686, establishing the CoHRI and internal orders 
of the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In this regard similar to Strom‟s approach I 
will look at how formal rules, principles, procedures shape firstly the structure of the 
commission, secondly how they shape process whereby CoHRI is supposed to interfere 
in the legislative and oversighting processes; and thirdly how they lay down the powers 
of the commission vis-à-vis other actors in the political system.  
 
3.2.1.1: Structure and internal working of the CoHRI 
The jurisdiction of the CoHRI is defined by the Act 3686. According to the 
Article 2 the jurisdiction of CoHRI contains the human rights and freedoms defined in 
the Constitution of Turkey, Universal Declaration of Human Rights and European 
Convention on Human Rights and in various universally acknowledged documents on 
human rights.   
According to the Internal Rulings of the TBMM total number of the members of 
the CoHRI is determined by the General Assembly for each legislative session (Article 
20). However with respect to the representation in the CoHRI; the Act 3686 makes 
additional arrangements specific to the CoHRI. Accordingly, member selection rules of 
CoHRI allow for the representation of independent members or political parties, which 
are not able to establish party groups in the Assembly, in the CoHRI (Article 3). A 
similar arrangement to the one on CoHRI exists also for some parliamentary 
commissions too; however their number is quite limited. In this regard CoHRI is 
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different in terms of allowing for the representation of independent members or political 
parties, which are not able to establish party groups in the Assembly alongside with the 
Commission on Equal Opportunity for Women and Men, the Commission on EU 
Harmonization, the Commission on Planning and Budget and the Commission on State 
Economic Enterprise (Neziroğlu, Kocaman & Gökçimen, 2011, p. 44). The selection of 
the members of the CoHRI is renewed two times for a single legislative period (Article 
3).  
In line with the internal rulings of the TBMM the Article 6 of the Act 3686 
states that for CoHRI to have a meeting, at least one third of its members should 
present. However with respect to the decision making process Act 3686 specifies 
additional arrangements. According to the internal rulings of the TBMM the 
commission can have a decision with the absolute majority of the present members 
(Article 27). However, in the Act 3686 in addition to the absolute majority rule it is 
stated that quorum of decision cannot be less than one fourth of the total number of the 
commission members and plus one (Article 6). Moreover commission can also decide to 
work through sub-commissions both in its investigatory and legislative functions 
(Article 6). However the reports, which are prepared as a result of sub-commission 
work, are subject to the voting in the commission meeting in order to be included in the 
commission report. 
 
3.2.1.2: Procedures and rules governing the relationship of the CoHRI to 
overall policy making process 
The commissions in TBMM are divided into two main categories on the basis of 
their duration as ad-hoc and standing commissions. Ad-hoc commissions, such as 
parliamentary inquiry and parliamentary investigation commissions are established for 
information gathering on a particular subject matter for a limited period of time. 
Standing commissions on the other hand are established permanently and each of them 
is specialized in a particular policy area (Neziroğlu, Kocaman & Gökçimen, 2011, p. 
42). CoHRI is also a standing commission, which is specialized on the subject of human 
rights. Until 2011 the work of the CoHRI is overwhelmingly composed of its 
investigatory functions. With the legal change, introduced in 2011, which adds review 
function to the duties of CoHRI in Act 3686, CoHRI became a different commission 
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alongside with very few parliamentary commissions by having both legislative and 
investigatory functions. In this regard since 2011 the CoHRI seems to perform both its 
investigatory and legislative functions and this is why the relationship of the CoHRI to 
the overall policy making process is sustained through two channels created by its 
investigatory and legislative functions.  
Nevertheless, as argued earlier the legislative functions of the commission has 
been started to be used since 2011 when a legal change, which adds review function to 
the duties of CoHRI in Act 3686, is put into effect. Before 2011, there is no legislative 
proposal assigned to CoHRI to examine its compatibility with the human rights. As 
argued by Eroğlu, even though review function is not enlisted in the duties of the 
CoHRI in Act 3686; according to the internal rulings of the TBMM commissions are 
already entrusted with the review functions and given that there is no a specific 
statement with respect to the review function in the Act 3686; CoHRI needs to be abide 
by the internal rulings of the TBMM in that respect and to have the function of 
examining legislative proposals for their compatibility with human rights (Eroğlu, 2007, 
p. 437; TBMM İç Tüzüğü, Article 35; Act 3686, Article 8). Nevertheless it seems not 
having the review function in the list of duties of CoHRI in Act 3686 in accordance 
with the internal rulings of the TBMM provided a framework for the development of a 
systematic reluctance on the part of the legislative process to bypass a commission, 
which is specialized on human rights policies.  
In order for CoHRI to perform its review function a legislative proposal needs to 
be assigned to the CoHRI by the Office of the Speaker (Article 4). However, as all 
standing commissions, a legislative proposal can be assigned to CoHRI either as a 
primary (esas komisyon) or secondary commission (tali komisyon). Primary commission 
is the one whose report on the legislative proposal in question constitutes the basis of 
the plenary discussions on the legislative proposal in question. However, secondary 
commission is supposed only to give consultation to the primary commission on the 
matters that is of its policy specialization. In this regard, primary commission is the 
“eventual decision maker” with respect to commission report on the legislative proposal 
in question (Neziroğlu, Kocaman & Gökçimen, 2011, pp. 51-52) Once a legislative 
proposal is assigned to a standing commission either as a primary (esas komisyon) or 
secondary commission (tali komisyon), this commission would have a direct potential to 
affect a change in the content of the proposal in question with respect to its 
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compatibility with constitutional rights and freedoms. However, the potential in 
question is different for primary (esas komisyon) and secondary commission (tali 
komisyon) roles.  This is so; because there are some structural limitations on the 
capacity of a commission to affect a change in the content of the proposal in question as 
a secondary commission. The structural limitations derive from the formal rules, which 
renders the capacity of secondary committees to affect a change in the content of the 
proposal weaker, by allowing the primary committees to prepare their reports without 
waiting for the preparation of secondary committee reports and without being abide 
mandatorily by the consultation provided by the secondary commissions once 
secondary committee reports are prepared. The relative weakness of the capacity of the 
secondary commissions to affect a change in the content of the legislative proposal is 
also exacerbated by the relatively lower chances for the secondary commission reports 
to be included in the plenary discussions on the legislative proposal in question given 
the limitations on their capacity to influence the primary commission report. 
Subsequent to the 2011 legal change, which adds the review function to the list 
of the duties of the CoHRI it seems there are eighty one legislative proposals have been 
assigned to the CoHRI for examination. Only in two of them CoHRI is assigned a 
primary commission (esas komisyon) role; in the rest of seventy nine cases CoHRI is 
assigned a secondary commission (tali komisyon) role. In this regard it seems the role of 
CoHRI in examining legislative proposals for their compatibility with the human rights 
is overwhelmingly composed of secondary commission role. However out of eighty one 
assignments CoHRI produced legislative reports for only five proposals. In four of these 
legislative proposals CoHRI is assigned a secondary commission role by the Office of 
the Speaker; and in one legislative proposal it is assigned a primary commission role for 
examination. In this regard there is an apparent under-performance on the part of the 
CoHRI to function as a secondary committee.  (For the allocation of assigned legislative 
proposals across years and for details of each year see the Graph 1) 
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It is significant to underline that when a legislative proposal is assigned to 
CoHRI either as a primary (esas komisyon) or secondary commission (tali komisyon) 
there are basically two channels available for the commission to affect a change on the 
legislative proposal in line with the human right concerns that it identifies. First channel 
is the commission meeting itself in which generally negotiations take place with the 
representative(s) of the body who had proposed the original legislative draft. So, these 
negotiations might result in the acceptance of the representative of the recommendations 
offered by the commission with respect to compatibility of the proposal in question with 
the human rights. As a result of the commission meeting commission prepares a report 
on the proposal in which the human rights concerns identified by the members of the 
commission, negotiations taking place with representative of the government and 
commission‟s recommendations are written down. This report is sent to the Presidency 
of the TBMM and to the Prime Ministry and to the concerned ministries through the 
Presidency of the TBMM. Upon the decision of Consultative Commission (Danışma 
Kurulu) the primary commission‟s report is read before and discussed in the plenary 
meetings (Article 6). Plenary meetings constitutes the second channel whereby 
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commission can affect a change in line with its recommendations and human rights 
concerns through stimulating debate on the proposal and influencing the plenary voting.  
However, with respect to its investigatory functions CoHRI can start an 
investigation on any matter of its interest by its own initiative. For example CoHRI can 
initiate an investigation on a prison upon a petition coming from a prisoner. Through its 
investigatory functions; CoHRI might also have an impact on the policy-making 
process. This is so because the reports which are prepared as a result of the CoHRI‟s 
investigatory functions are sent to the Office of Secretary and upon the decision of 
Board of Consultants commission‟s report can be read before the parliament and 
discussed in the plenary meetings. So through plenary meetings the investigatory 
reports of the CoHRI might have an impact by stimulating debate in the Assembly on 
the inadequacies in the implementation of the human rights at the national level and 
giving motivation for the preparation of legislative proposals by government or by the 
parliament addressing these inadequacies. This is why the investigatory functions of the 
CoHRI have a significant capacity to further integrate human rights perspective into the 
earlier phases of policy making process if it is able to activate the general assembly 
mechanisms. 
3.2.1.3: Powers of the CoHRI 
The functions of the CoHRI specified in the Article 4 of the Act 3686 as the 
following: firstly the commission is responsible for reviewing and following recent 
developments and changes with regards to human rights at international level; secondly 
the commission is responsible for checking the compatibility of the Constitution and 
other legal documents with the international treaties and universal declarations on 
human rights that the country complies with and for offering necessary legal 
arrangements. Thirdly the commission is responsible for examining legislative 
proposals as primary or secondary commission and of providing opinion, if it is 
requested, on issues which are discussed in other commissions in the National 
Assembly; fourthly the commission is responsible for investigating the compatibility of 
the practical implementations in the country with the Constitution and with the 
international treaties and universal declarations that the country complies with and for 
offering necessary amendments. Fifthly the commission is responsible for investigating 
the individual appeals to the commission by the citizens; inquiring whether there is 
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rights violation or not and referring them to the government offices concerned in case of 
rights violation. Sixthly the commission is responsible for investigating the human 
rights violations in foreign countries and for increasing the awareness of the 
parliamentarians in these countries of these violations. Finally the commission is 
responsible for preparing a report on its annual activities (General Information about the 
Human Rights Inquiry).  
The competencies of the CoHRI are specified in the Article 5 of the Act 3686 as 
the following: the commission has the right to obtain information from the ministerial 
officials, government representatives, bureaucrats, local governors and from public and 
private institutions in its investigatory and legislative functions. Moreover the 
commission also has a right to consult experts on matters of CoHRI‟s interest (General 
Information about the Human Rights Inquiry).  
Even though the CoHRI has the right to obtain information from various actors 
ranging from ministerial officials, government representatives to local governors in its 
investigatory and legislative functions; there is no ruling with respect to the 
competencies of the CoHRI which would empower CoHRI to follow its either 
investigatory or legislative reports up in order to hold accountable the relevant actors for 
the action that they choose with respect to these reports.  
 
3.2.2: Impact Analysis 
The impact analysis to be carried out in the following of the CoHRI‟s work will 
be composed of two parts. In the first part, I will look at how government responded to 
the identification of human rights concerns with respect to a legislative proposal of 
government origin by CoHRI‟s review function. In this regard I will make an analysis 
on the legislative reports of the CoHRI and look at how government responded to the 
recommendations of the CoHRI, which identifies human rights concerns with respect to 
the legislative proposal in question. Moreover in tracing the impact of the commission 
work on the eventual legislative outcome of government origin I will use a scale similar 
to Hindmoor, Phil Larkin & Andrew Kennon (2009) and Monk (2012) in order to make 
a more systematic evaluation of the commission‟s influence on the government. In this 
regard I will utilize a scale of government acceptance of the comments raised by the 
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members of the CoHRI in analyzing the commission‟s impact on the government. The 
scale in question will be composed of four categories which specify different kinds of 
responses that can be expected from the government. These categories are “accepting 
the comment”; “providing justification for defending the proposal in question”; 
“ignoring the comment”; “specifically rejecting the comment”. Accepting the comment 
occurs when in the commission meeting the representative of the government agrees 
with the comment and makes a promise of act in line with the comment. Providing 
justification for defending the proposal in question occurs when the representative 
government does not agree with the comment; however he or she provides a 
justification for not doing so. Ignoring the comment occurs when the representative of 
the government simply ignores the comment and not even gives a justification in 
defense of the proposal. Specifically rejecting the comment occurs when the 
representative of the government specifically rejects the comment in a negative manner. 
Subsequent to the categorization of government responses I will also try to 
understand to what extent the promise of action in line with the comments raised by the 
CoHRI‟s members is realized in the eventual legislative outcome. In order to understand 
whether recommendations, which get a promise of action by the government, are 
realized or not I will compare the recommendations of the commission and the eventual 
legislative outcome. 
The analysis in this part would reveal the impact of the CoHRI‟s work on the 
government in terms of affecting a real change on the legislative proposals of 
government origin in line with the recommendations of the CoHRI‟s legislative reports 
which are formulated on the basis of the human rights concerns that CoHRI‟s review 
function identifies on the legislative proposals in question.  
 In the second part I will look at the number of times the CoHRI‟s either 
investigatory and or its legislative reports are able to stimulate deliberative discussions 
on human rights issues in plenary meetings. In this regard similar to the methodological 
approach adopted by Hindmoor, Phil Larkin & Andrew Kennon (2009) and Tolley 
(2009) I will look at the number of times the references are made either to the 
investigatory or legislative reports of the CoHRI in plenary discussions in order to 
reveal the impact of both investigatory and legislative functions of the CoHRI in terms 
of further stimulate deliberative discussions on human rights issues in the plenary 
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meetings. Moreover in order to have an understanding of the influence of legal change, 
introduced in 2011 with regards to CoHRI‟s review function, on the human rights focus 
in the parliament‟s performance of its other functions; I will look at how human rights 
focus of oral questions, which is one of the most significant scrutiny mechanisms of the 
parliament, has changed across years. The analysis in the second part would reveal the 
impact of the CoHRI‟s work on the parliament in terms of enhancing the integration of 
human rights reflection into the policy making process. 
 
3.2.2.1: Impact of CoHRI on the government 
As argued earlier since 2011, when CoHRI started to perform its review function 
actively, CoHRI has gotten eighty one assignments; however CoHRI produced 
legislative reports for only five proposals. In four of these legislative proposals CoHRI 
is assigned a secondary commission role by the Office of the Speaker; and in one 
legislative proposal it is assigned a primary commission role for examination. 
Moreover it is also significant that four of the legislative proposals which are 
assigned to the CoHRI either as the primary or secondary commission for examination, 
have government origin and one proposal is made by the member of the governing 
political party. So given that the purpose of the first part of the impact analysis is to 
reveal the impact of the CoHRI‟s work on the government in line with the stakeholders 
approach in the literature on assessing commission work; it is important for the 
purposes of this study that all of this limited number of legislative proposals has 
government origin. 
Prior to the detailed analysis of the each legislative proposal, it is significant to 
underline once more time that there are basically two channels available for the 
commission to affect a change on the legislative proposal in line with the human right 
concerns that CoHRI identifies. First channel is the commission meeting itself in which 
generally negotiations take place with the representative(s) of the Assembly who had 
proposed the original legislative draft. So, these negotiations might result in the 
acceptance of the representative of the recommendations offered by the commission 
with respect to compatibility of the proposal in question with the human rights. Second 
channel is plenary meetings in which the legislative reports of the commission are read 
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at the General Assembly (Floor) meeting of the TBMM. The recommendations of the 
legislative reports of the commission can affect a change through stimulating debate on 
the proposal and influencing the plenary voting.  
The first legislative proposal which would be the subject of the impact analysis 
is a proposal which is offered by a member of the governing party. This legislative 
proposal is aimed at laying out the necessary conditions for giving permission to a 
convicted person to take a day in cases of the death or in cases of terminal illnesses of a 
relative. The proposal in question is examined by the CoHRI as the secondary 
commission and an analysis of the legislative report would reveal that there are eight 
comments in the negotiation process on the legislative proposal which can be subsumed 
under the heading of concerns for the right to fair trial in the commission meeting. 
However in the negotiation process it seems out of eight comments, which raise right to 
fair trial concerns, only one comment gets an acceptance and a promise for action by the 
member of the Assembly who had originally proposed the bill. Six of the comments can 
be classified under the category of “providing justification”. With respect to these 
comments even though the representative of the government does not agree with the 
human rights concerns, that the members of the commission identify, he or she gives a 
justification for not doing so. One comment can be classified under the category of 
“ignoring the recommendation” by not having even a comment or justification by the 
representative of the government. The eventual legislative report does not seem to 
include these concerns on the right to fair trial and it is indicated in the report that there 
is no issue of incompatibility of the legislative proposal in question with respect to any 
of the fundamental rights and freedoms. However it seems as if an opposition mark is 
attached to the report by a single member of the commission which raises more strongly 
the concerns on the proposal in question with respect to the limitations it might bring on 
the right of the fair trial.  
Nevertheless if second channel of impact is considered it is revealed on the basis 
of the plenary discussions on the legislative proposal in question that concerns on the 
proposal voiced both in the discussions in the CoHRI meeting and in the opposition 
mark of the legislative report seem to stimulate a significant debate in the plenary 
meeting (General Assembly Discussion, 24
th
 Period, 2
nd
 legislative term, 100
th
 session). 
These discussions seem to lead to a proposal of motion which urges the withdrawal of 
the first part of the legislative proposal that is criticized a lot with respect to the 
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limitations it might bring on the right to fair trial. This motion is accepted and the 
controversial part is removed from the proposal. Moreover, when the eventual 
legislative outcome is analyzed it is revealed that one comment, which gets a promise of 
action by the representative of the government, seems to be not implemented. So, it 
seems in this case CoHRI seems to be more successful in affecting a real change on the 
legislative proposals of government origin in line with the concerns that CoHRI‟s 
review function identifies in the plenary meeting compared to the commission meeting 
itself.  
The second legislative proposal which would be the subject matter of the impact 
analysis is a proposal which is offered by the Ministry of Interior. This legislative 
proposal is intended to fill the gap which is brought about the by the lack of legal 
framework that arranges the issues related to immigration into the country. It is 
indicated in the legislative proposal that these intended legal arrangements are aimed at 
sustaining the delicate balance between universal human rights and freedoms and 
security with regards to immigration issues (Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanun 
Tasarısı, 2012, p. 3). The proposal in question is examined by the CoHRI as the 
secondary commission and analysis of the legislative report would reveal that the 
legislative proposal evaluated by the CoHRI positively given that this proposal is the 
first serious attempt which is intended to arrange immigration issues (CoHRI‟s Report 
on “Yabancılar ve Uluslararası Koruma Kanun Tasarısı”, 2012, p. 16). It seems there 
are four comments in the negotiation process out of which two are about techniques of 
law writing and practicability. The other two comments can be considered as identifying 
a human rights concern. One comment is about removal of a paragraph on the basis of 
the concern that this paragraph might allow discrimination in the implication of the 
“non-refoulment” principle and might create undesirable instances of human rights 
violation in the immigration process and the other comment is about the extension of 
the time period permitted for the immigrant to leave the country (p. 17). The legislative 
report indicates that in the process of negotiation with the representative of the 
government two of the comments, which identify human rights concern, get acceptance 
and a promise of action in the commission meeting. The legislative report does not 
specify any recommendation on this proposal given the positive atmosphere on the 
proposal. If the eventual legislative outcome is analyzed it is revealed that both 
comments, which get promise of action by the government representative in the 
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negotiation process, are implemented. So, in this case CoHRI seems to be more 
successful in affecting a real change on the legislative proposals of government origin in 
line with the concerns that CoHRI‟s review function identifies in the commission 
meeting compared to the first proposal discusses above. 
The third legislative proposal which would be the subject matter of the impact 
analysis is a proposal which is offered by the Council of Ministers. This legislative 
proposal is intended to lay out the legal framework for the establishment of the Türkiye 
İnsan Hakları Kurumu (National Human Rights Institution of Turkey (TIHK)) in line 
with the Paris Principles, an internationally recognized United Nations document which 
frame the standards for the work of National Human Rights Institutions (Türkiye İnsan 
Hakları Kurumu Kanun Tasarısı, 2010, p. 4-5). The legislative proposal in question is 
examined by the CoHRI as the primary commission and it is decided beforehand to 
establish a sub-commission for a more detailed examination of the proposal in question 
(CoHRI‟s Report on “Türkiye İnsan Hakları Kurumu Kanun Tasarısı”, 2012, p.10).  
In the sub-commission meeting representatives from different civil society 
organizations were also present and voice their viewpoints on the proposal. When the 
sub-commission report is analyzed it seems there are serious concerns on the part of the 
civil society representatives for the proposal. The problems which are identified by the 
civil society representatives can be categorized into five categories, which are 
respectively five comments on the lack of clarity in the proposal on the functions and 
competencies of the TIHK; four comments on the overwhelming dominance of the 
executive branch of the government both in selection of the members and functioning of 
the TIHK including lack of financial independence; one comment on the inadequate 
role assigned for the selection of the members to both civil society organizations and the 
parliament; three comments on the inadequacies with respect to the assignment of staffs 
to the TIHK and non-assurance of immunity for the staff; and two comments on under-
emphasis of the principle of pluralism in the TIHK. Even though these concerns cannot 
be subsumed under a particular human right concern; they are still important in raising 
some problems about the structure of a national institution which would probably play a 
significant role in human rights scrutiny and in investigating human rights violations in 
the country. However when the eventual sub-commission report is analyzed it seems 
there are ten recommendations on the proposal nine of which is about the techniques of 
codification and practicability issues. Only one recommendation can be seen a minor 
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attempt to clarify the functions and competencies of the Türkiye İnsan Hakları Kurumu 
(TIHK) in line with the concerns of the civil society organizations. The relative 
disinterest of the civil society representatives seem to suggest that the CoHRI fails to be 
an alternative channel for the civil society to participate in the decision making process 
in this case, a function which is foreseen by the new approaches to the national human 
rights protection mechanism. However it should also be indicated that there are two 
opposition marks, attached to the sub-commission report, and these opposition marks 
seem to voice the same concerns as the civil society representatives strongly.  
In the commission meeting, where representatives from the government also 
present, similar concerns are raised as in the sub-commission meeting. There are three 
comments on the overwhelming dominance of the executive in the selection of the 
members and in the functioning of the TIHK; two comment on the need for the more 
space for the participation of the civil society and the parliament in the selection of the 
members of the TIHK and the assurance of the pluralism principle in the functioning of 
the TIHK In the negotiation process with the government representatives it seems as if 
that government representatives try to respond to the concerns which are raised in both 
the sub-commission report and the commission meeting. In this regard in this analysis it 
would be useful to take the comments raised by the civil society organizations given 
that the comments raised in the commission meeting are the summary of the comments 
raised in the sub-commission meeting. In the negotiation process government 
representative seems to reject specifically three comments on the lack of assurance of 
the administrative and financial independence of the Institution from the government. 
Four of the comments get acceptance and promise of action by the government 
representative and two comments gets a justification. In this regard six comments seems 
to be ignored by the government representative (CoHRI‟s Report on “Türkiye İnsan 
Hakları Kurumu Kanun Tasarısı”, 2012, pp. 58-59).  
In the legislative report it seems there are eleven recommendations four of which 
is about techniques of codification. The seven of the recommendations are intended to 
reflect the concerns raised both by the civil society representatives and by the 
opposition parties in the sub-commission and commission meetings by offering 
provisions for the integration of pluralism principle into the selection of the members of 
the Institution and for providing a larger role for the participation of the civil society 
organization into the selection process (CoHRI‟s Report on “Türkiye İnsan Hakları 
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Kurumu Kanun Tasarısı”, 2012, pp. 60-61). However there are two opposition marks 
attached to the legislative report from which it can be inferred that these 
recommendations are far from fulfilling the concerns of the both opposition and civil 
society organizations. 
Nevertheless if second channel of impact is considered, it is revealed on the 
basis of the plenary discussions on the legislative proposal in question that concerns on 
the proposal voiced by the representatives of the civil society organizations and by the 
opposition marks of the legislative report seem to stimulate a significant debate in the 
plenary meeting (General Assembly Discussion, 24
th
 Period, 2
nd
 legislative term, 122
th
 
and 123
th 
sessions). However even though all of the seven recommendations of the 
CoHRI‟s legislative report, which are intended to reflect the concerns raised both by the 
civil society representatives and by the opposition parties, is implemented in the 
eventual law; the discussions in the plenary meeting seem to be not affecting a further 
change in the content of the legislative proposal in line with the concerns on the 
proposal voiced by the representatives of the civil society organizations and by the 
opposition marks of the legislative report.   
The fourth legislative proposal which would be the subject matter of the impact 
analysis is a proposal which is offered by the Ministry of Justice. The legislative 
proposal in question is intended firstly to bring the regulations on execution more in line 
with the purpose of re-integrating the condemned people into the society and secondly 
to lay out the conditions for allowing for defense in languages other than Turkish (Ceza 
Muhakemesi Kanunu ile Ceza ve Güvenlik Tedbirlerinin İnfazı Hakkında Kanunda 
Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Tasarısı, 2012, pp. 34-35). The legislative proposal 
in question is examined by the CoHRI as the secondary commission and analysis of the 
legislative report would reveal that in the commission meeting there are four comments 
which raise human rights concerns. Three of these comments raise the concern that part 
of the proposal, which is about the defense in languages other than Turkish, might 
create some problems about the right of defense within the context of the right to fair 
trial. One comment raises the concern that the deprival of the people, who are 
condemned of terrorism, from the legal arrangements about the deference of the 
execution in the proposal might end up in acts of discrimination. However in the 
negotiation process it seems all of four comments, which raise human rights concerns, 
gets ignored by the representative of the government (CoHRI‟s report on “Ceza 
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Muhakemesi Kanunu ile Ceza ve Güvenlik Tedbirlerinin İnfazı Hakkında Kanunda 
Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Tasarısı”, 2012, pp. 37-38). The eventual 
legislative reports seem to include none of the comments, which raise concerns for the 
right to defense within the context of the right to fair trial, as a recommendation. 
However it seems there are two opposition marks, attached to the report, which raises 
more strongly the concerns on the proposal in question with respect to the limitations it 
might bring on the right to defense within the context of the right to fair trial.  
Nevertheless if second channel of impact is taken into consideration it is 
revealed on the basis of the plenary discussions on the legislative proposal in question 
that concerns on the proposal voiced both in the discussions in the CoHRI meeting and 
in the opposition mark of the legislative report seem to stimulate a significant debate in 
the plenary meeting (General Assembly Discussion, 24
th
 Period, 3
rd
 Legislative Term, 
56
th
 and 57
th
 Sessions). However the discussions in the plenary meeting seem to be not 
affecting a further change in the content of the legislative proposal in line with the 
concerns on the proposal voiced by the comments in the commission meeting and in the 
opposition marks.   
The final legislative proposal which would be the subject matter of the impact 
analysis is a proposal which is offered by the Ministry of Family and Social Policies. 
The legislative proposal in question is intended to replace the demeaning words which 
are used in laws and decrees in the force of law for describing disabled people in order 
to eradicate the negative perception of disabled people by the society because of the 
usage of such descriptions and to enhance the integration of the disabled people into the 
society further (CoHRI‟s report on Kanun ve Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Yer 
Alan Engelli Bireylere Yönelik İbarelerin Değiştirilmesi Amacıyla Bazı Kanun ve 
Kanun Hükmünde Kararnamelerde Değişiklik Yapılmasına Dair Kanun Tasarısı, 2013, 
pp. 4-5). The commission report indicates that legislative proposal in question is 
perceived positively by the CoHRI. Given the nature of the legislative proposal there is 
no recommendation on this proposal.  
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When all five legislative proposals are considered together, it seems as if out of 
the twenty nine comments, raised in the negotiation process, only seven comments 
become a recommendation in the legislative reports. With respect to the government 
responses to the comments raised in the negotiation process in the commission meeting 
out of the twenty nine comments government responses to seven comments are 
classified under the category of “acceptance”; government responses to eight comments 
are classified under the category of “providing justification”; government responses to 
eleven comments are classified under the category of “ignorance”; government 
responses to three comments are classified under the category of “rejection”. When 
eventual legislative outcomes are analyzed in order to understand whether comments, 
which get a promise of action by the government, are realized or not; it is revealed that 
out of 7 comments, which get promise of action by the government, six of which were 
implemented in the eventual legislative process.  
 
3.2.2.2: Impact of CoHRI on the parliament 
When the General Assembly records, from December of 1991 to the July of 
2013, are searched for the term “Commission on Human Rights Inquiry” in order to find 
out the number of times either legislative or investigatory reports of the CoHRI is cited 
in the plenary meetings; it is revealed that only in six cases the reports of the CoHRI is 
read out and stimulated discussion in the plenary meetings. In five cases the legislative 
reports of the CoHRI, which constitute the subject matter of the analysis in the previous 
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part, and only in one occasion the investigatory report of the CoHRI is read out in the 
General Assembly. 
It seems with the legal change on CoHRI‟s review function, which was 
introduced in 2011, a significant channel has become available for CoHRI to gets its 
work to be recognized in the General Assembly. Even though CoHRI‟s performance of 
its review function has its own problems it seems there is a relatively greater capacity 
for CoHRI‟s legislative reports to get recognized in the General Assembly compared to 
its investigatory reports. This is so; mainly because the process whereby CoHRI‟s 
legislative reports get into the agenda of the General Assembly discussions is a 
relatively formalized one. Such a formalized process stands in a significant contrast to 
the under-formalized process whereby investigatory reports are supposed to have an 
impact on the parliament in line with its recommendations. The under-formalized 
process for investigatory reports seems to make legislative reports of CoHRI a more 
significant mechanism for CoHRI‟s work to have an influence on the parliament.  
In this regard the year 2011 seems to be a critical point in terms of the capacity 
of CoHRI for having an influence on the way the parliament approach human rights 
issues in performing its own functions. As argued earlier one of the most significant 
aspects of the new approaches to the national human rights protection mechanisms is 
the emphasis on these mechanisms‟ role to increase the place of human rights 
considerations in the deliberative processes and to create a culture of rights in the policy 
making process (Evans & Evans, 2006; Hiebert, 2006a). In this regard the fact that the 
CoHRI became a more active commission in terms of getting its work recognized in the 
General Assembly after 2011 might have an impact on the human rights focus in the 
legislature‟s performance of its other functions. Therefore we may expect a gentle 
increase in the human rights focus in the TBMM‟s performance of its other functions 
starting with the 2011 decision when CoHRI became a more active commission. 
In this regard I will look at how human rights focus of oral questions, which is 
one of the most significant scrutiny mechanisms of the parliament, change across years 
in order to have a clue about the influence of CoHRI‟s actively performing its review 
function. We may expect a gentle increase in the human rights focus of oral questions 
starting with the 2011 when CoHRI became a more active commission. It is not possible 
to attribute such an increase, if any, in the number of oral questions which focus on 
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human rights issues starting with the year 2011 to the CoHRI‟s becoming a more active 
commission; given that there are number of other factor such as the composition of the 
parliament which might play a role in such an increase. Nevertheless it is still important 
not to get a conclusion from the data which is contradictory to the expectation that is 
lied down above.  
When an analysis is made on the situation of oral questions from 1998 to the 
present it seems as if that the oral questions can be categorized into six categories on the 
basis of the treatment that they get.  The analysis reveals that among the 21
st
, 22
nd
 and 
23
rd
 legislative terms the ratio of oral questions which are answered seems to be highest 
in 23
rd
 legislative term; given that the 24
th
  term has not yet ended (For the ratios of 
other categories see the Graph 3). 
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The results presented below are based on the analysis of oral question which 
focus on human rights issues by using the search term “right” and selecting the relevant 
cases. However the analysis only covers the 21
st
 and 24
th
 legislative terms which 
correspond to the years 1998 to 2014; because there is no available data for years 1991-
1998. When we look at the ratio of oral questions which focus on human rights issues 
within the tally of each legislative term it seems as if there is a steady increase in the 
human rights focus of the oral questions even though results are not conclusive given 
that the 24
th
 term has not yet ended. 
 
However when the number of oral questions which focus on human rights issues 
is analyzed; such an analysis presents a clearer picture with respect to the influence of 
CoHRI‟s actively performing its review function starting with 2011. The analysis 
reveals that there is an increase in the number of oral questions which focus on human 
rights issues starting with the year 2011. Between 2011 and 2013 the minimum number 
of the oral questions which focus on human rights issues is larger than the maximum 
amount attained between 1998 and 2010.  
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As argued earlier, even though it is not possible to attribute such an increase in 
the number of oral questions which focus on human rights issues starting with the year 
2011 to the CoHRI‟s becoming a more active commission; it is still important to have a 
conclusion inferred from the data which does not contradict the expectations.  
 
3.3: Interpretation of the Data Analysis in Relation to the Hypotheses 
The descriptive analysis of the CoHRI‟s performance of its functions, which are 
related to providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism, yields that CoHRI has 
relatively limited influence in terms of both affecting a change throughout the 
legislation process and oversighting the government from a human rights perspective. 
Even though the analysis in question has a quite limited capacity to yield conclusive 
assessment on CoHRI‟s performance as a pre-emptive right review mechanism; it is still 
possible to identify some problems, which are introduced below, with respect to the 
CoHRI‟s pre-emptive right review function on the basis of the analysis and the in-depth 
interviews that I conducted with five bureaucrats and three members of the TBMM who 
worked in the CoHRI. 
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Graph 5: The number of oral questions focusing on human 
rights issues for each year
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The first problem is the apparent reluctance on the part of the Presidency of 
TBMM to assign legislative proposals to the CoHRI for reviewing as the primary 
commission (esas komisyon) even in matters which are within the jurisdiction of the 
commission. It seems, not having the review function in the list of duties of CoHRI in 
Act 3686 in accordance with the internal rulings of the TBMM until 2011 provided a 
framework for the development of a systematic reluctance on the part of the legislative 
process to bypass a commission, which is specialized on human rights policies. As 
indicated earlier out of eighty one assignments of legislative proposals to the CoHRI 
only in one case the CoHRI can have a primary commission (esas komisyon) role. This 
problem is also cited in many of my interviewees. One of them argued that: 
“One of the most important issues with respect to the commission is the fact that 
non-assignment of the legislative proposals on human right law, to the 
commission for review. If the commissions, which examine the legislative 
proposals in question as the primary commission, ask for the CoHRI‟s opinion 
CoHRI can express its opinion; however this happens very rarely.” 
Two of my interviewees argued that this situation also resulted from the reciprocity 
between ministerial and commission organization. They state that given CoHRI does 
not have a corresponding ministry the commission is not assigned for any bills to be 
examined as draft laws. However when asked if this situation has consequences on 
human rights protection another interviewee replied: 
“There is a decrease in the Assembly‟s scrutiny and legislative proposals, which 
are in need of being discussed from a human rights perspective, become laws 
without being discussed from a human rights perspective. I cannot make sense of 
this. CoHRI is a specialized commission on human rights issues; if all other 
commissions are assigned with examining the proposals which are within their 
jurisdictions and there is reciprocity between executive and commissions then 
CoHRI should be assigned with examining the legislative proposals on human 
rights issues. For example now there are legislative proposals on judiciary and 
on internet; all of them should be assigned to CoHRI but this is not happening.” 
The second problem is the CoHRI‟s apparent underperformance of its reviewing 
function as the secondary commission (tali komisyon). As indicated earlier, even though 
there is a reluctance on the part of the Presidency of TBMM to assign legislative 
proposals, which are within the scope of human rights, to the CoHRI for reviewing as 
the primary commission (esas komisyon); since 2011 the CoHRI seems to be assigned 
eighty legislative proposals as the secondary commission (tali komisyon). However out 
of eighty proposals, CoHRI produced legislative reports for only four proposals. When 
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my interviewees are asked for explanation they generally suggest that the commission 
time is overwhelmed by its investigatory work. One of my interviewees stated also that: 
“… primary commissions do not need to wait for the reports of the secondary 
commissions for preparing their own reports; or even the secondary commission 
prepares it report the primary commission does not have to consider this report. 
Therefore I cannot say that as a secondary commission CoHRI has considerable 
effectiveness.” 
In this regard structural obstacles to the impact of the secondary commission 
work, as indicated above by my interviewee, might account for the apparent reluctance 
of CoHRI to perform its reviewing function as the secondary commission. This is so; 
because as argued earlier there are some structural limitations on the capacity of a 
commission to affect a change in the content of the proposal in question as a secondary 
commission. The structural limitations derive from the formal rules which renders the 
capacity of secondary commissions to affect a change in the content of the proposal 
weaker by allowing primary commissions to prepare their reports without waiting for 
the preparation of secondary commission reports and without being abide mandatorily 
by the consultation provided by the secondary commissions once secondary 
commission reports are prepared. The relative weakness of the capacity of the 
secondary commissions to affect a change in the content of the legislative proposal is 
also exacerbated by the relatively lower chances for the secondary commission reports 
to be included in the plenary discussions on the legislative proposal in question given 
the limitations on their capacity to influence the primary commission report. 
The third problem is the inability of the commission reports, specifically ones 
which are prepared as a result of the commission‟s investigatory functions to be 
integrated into the agenda and debates of the General Assembly. This problem seems to 
hinder a possible positive relationship between the investigatory functions of the 
Commission and the General Assembly. The inability of the commission‟s investigatory 
reports to be presented to the General Assembly deprives the Assembly from a valuable 
source of information that has the capacity to be free from government influence and 
negates the possible contribution of CoHRI‟s investigatory work to integration of 
human rights perspective into the earlier phases of policy making. Given the 
overwhelming majority of the secondary commission (tali komisyon) role among 
legislative proposal assignments that CoHRI gets for examination; the reason for this 
problem might be the relatively lower chances for the secondary commission reports to 
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be included in the plenary discussions on the legislative proposal in question given the 
limitations on their capacity to influence the primary commission report. However the 
problem in question also relates to the absence of any ruling which would empower 
CoHRI to follow its either investigatory or legislative reports up in order to hold 
accountable the relevant actors for the action that they choose with respect to these 
reports. The lack of competence on the part of CoHRI in this regard might account for 
the inability of the CoHRI‟s investigatory and legislative reports to be discussed in 
plenary meetings through actively using accountability principle. This problem is also 
identified in the interviews I conducted. One of my interviewee, who worked as a 
bureaucrat in the commission, stated with respect to the investigatory reports that: 
“Following up of the commission reports is also very important. The General 
Assembly mechanisms for commission reports should be activated. But 
commission reports are not represented generally in the General Assembly. This 
is why ministries cannot be held accountable and the accountability principle 
cannot be activated through commission reports.” 
Another interviewee underlined the significance of the recognition of the 
commission‟s investigatory reports in enhancing the commission‟s influence: 
“Another change that would increase the effectiveness would be the activation of 
accountability principle through the commission. For example representatives of 
the government or bureaucrats from the ministries which the commission report 
is directed should attend the commission meetings and give account of what 
have been done about the issues that are highlighted in the commission reports; 
and this should be compulsory. Now reports are prepared but without activating 
the principle of accountability thorough these reports the scrutiny of the 
executive is not realized effectively.”   
The three problems identified above on the basis of the descriptive analysis and 
the in-depth interviews do not falsify the Hypothesis I which states that the legal status 
of the CoHRI decreases the level of influence CoHRI has in terms of providing a pre-
emptive right review mechanism. This is so; because all three problems, which are 
respectively the reluctance to assign to CoHRI a primary commission (esas komisyon) 
role, the underperformance of CoHRI of its secondary commission (esas komisyon) role 
and inability of CoHRI‟s reports to be integrated into the agenda and debates of the 
General Assembly, can be traced back to the formal rules and procedures both on 
legislative commissions in general and on CoHRI in particular. In this regard three 
problems in question do not falsify the hypothesis that rules and regulations, which 
form the status of the CoHRI, render the level of influence CoHRI has with regards to 
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providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism weaker in terms of both affecting a 
change throughout the legislation process and oversighting the government from a 
human rights perspective. 
The fourth problem which can be identified with respect to the CoHRI‟s 
performance as a pre-emptive right review mechanism is the difficulties that opposition 
parties face to overcome the numerical dominance of the governing party in the 
commission work. It seems as if that the numerical domination of the commission by 
the members of the governing party makes it more difficult for the members of the 
opposition parties to get their voices heard and render the commission ineffective in 
terms of holding the government accountable through both it investigatory and 
legislative functions. This situation can also be observed in the legislative proposals 
which are analyzed in this part. In three of the contested legislative proposals opposition 
seems to have difficulty in getting their concerns as recommendations of the eventual 
legislative report of the commission. Only in one case they are able to list a few of their 
concerns in the recommendation part. Rather they are left with the option of attaching 
an opposition mark to the report in question. One of my interviewee, who worked as a 
bureaucrat in the commission, stated that:  
“The commission is generally more effective when coalition governments are in 
power. For example between 1998 and 2002, when coalition governments were 
in power and when the commission is not dominated by a single governing 
party, I can say commission worked quite effectively.” 
Moreover same interviewee also stated that another related issue is the non-
acceptance of the sub-commission reports, which constitutes one of the most suitable 
areas of work for the members of the opposition parties to get their voices heard. He 
states that: 
“… one of the most significant problems the inability of the sub-commission 
reports to become accepted by the commission through completing whole legal 
processes. The acceptance of sub-commission reports through passing all legal 
processes; becoming a commission decision and therefore presentation of these reports 
at the General Assembly is very significant for the effectiveness of the commission; 
because the place where opposition is most effective is the sub-commissions. In this 
regard sub-commission reports‟ becoming a commission decision is very important.” 
As argued earlier sub-commission reports are subject to voting in order to 
become a commission decision and when the commission is dominated by the members 
of the governing party it becomes more difficult for sub-commission reports, in which 
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opposition is most actively participate, to become a commission report.  Non-
acceptance of the sub-commission reports as the commission decision also negates any 
possibility for these sub-commission reports to be read and discussed in the General 
Assembly and to contribute to the integration of human rights perspective into the 
earlier phases of policy making. In this regard the inability of the sub-commission 
reports to become a commission report constitutes another site of the problem.  
The extent of the problem can be inferred from the comments of my 
interviewees on how to make the commission a more influential right review 
mechanism. Choosing the president of the commission among the members of the 
opposition party or allowing for the equal representation for all political parties in the 
parliament are cited in the answers and they seem to suggest the empowerment of the 
opposition parties in the commission work. One of my interviewee, who worked as a 
bureaucrat in the commission, stated that:  
“A change, which would increase the effectiveness of the commission 
politically, is to choose the head of the commission from the members of the 
opposition parties. If it happens so there would be a quite effective scrutiny. 
Because now both the head of the commission and the majority of the members 
of the commission are from the governing party and such a commission with that 
composition is supposed to scrutinize the executive which is also from the same 
party. This of course is not effective. But if the head of the commission is from 
the opposition commission can work effectively for real.”  
Another interviewee, who worked as a bureaucrat in the commission, stated that:  
“The most important change is to make the head of the commission from the 
opposition. The fact that the head of the commission is from the governing party 
weaken the effectiveness with respect to the scrutiny. Eventually it is very 
difficult for the governing party to scrutinize an executive which is 
overwhelmingly composed of the majority party.”  
Another interviewee, who was a previous President of the CoHRI and now head 
of a significant civil society organization, argued that: 
“These kind of commissions are established to scrutinize the government. When 
commissions are also composed overwhelmingly by the governing party the 
scrutiny function cannot be performed properly. For scrutiny and investigative 
commissions to perform their functions effectively similar to the Commission on 
Constitution political parties should be represented in the commission on equal 
basis. When I was in charge, I offered this as an internal order change but it was 
not accepted. The head of the commission can be from the governing party, 
because the governing party deserves such a status, given that amount of vote 
they get for becoming the executive and moreover there is already an executive 
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border where other parties also take place. But the membership to the 
commission should be allocated to all parties on equal basis.”  
The fifth problem is the seeming failure of the commission to be an alternative 
channel for the participation of civil society organizations in the earlier phases of law 
making a function which is foreseen by the new approaches to the national human rights 
protection mechanism. This situation can also be observed in the legislative proposals 
which are analyzed in this part. Out of five only in one case civil society‟s 
representation is ensured however in this case it seems civil society representatives had 
significant difficulties in getting their concerns as recommendations in the commission 
reports. One of my interviewees, who was a previous President of the CoHRI and now 
is the head of a significant civil society organization underline the difficulties that civil 
society organizations face in affecting a change in the content of the legislation and 
participating in the earlier phases of policy making through CoHRI. He states that: 
“We as a civil society organization have not yet got asked for our opinion by the 
commission. We ourselves make some demands on the basis of our own 
initiatives. For example we communicated with the commission to convey our 
demands and advices to make some changes on the law on Polis Vazife ve 
Salahiyetleri (Police Forces‟ Duty and Competencies); however we did not get 
adequate interest and support from the commission. With respect to this demand 
of change we also talked with the political party groups; even though the 
opposition seemed more moderate we could not still get a concrete result. So I 
do not think the commission is willing to cooperate with the civil society 
organizations…The commission becomes a mechanism for the governing party 
to empower its position completely” 
About the legislative proposal on establishing the Türkiye İnsan Hakları Kurumu 
(National Human Rights Institution of Turkey) he states that: 
“For example, throughout the process whereby Türkiye İnsan Hakları Kurumu 
(National Human Rights Institution of Turkey) was established, despite the fact 
that we as civil society organizations communicated our concerns on the fact 
that such an institution with those kinds of working principles or selection of 
members cannot function independently of the government; this institution was 
established without taking our concerns and objections into the consideration 
and now it has no independent work.” 
Another side of the problem in question seems to be the lack of 
institutionalization of the relationship between the CoHRI and civil society. This 
situation is cited in the comments of my interviewees on the relationship of the civil 
society and CoHRI. In these comments it is stated that the lack of institutionalization 
leaves the relationship between the commission and civil society organization 
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dependent upon the personal preferences and efforts of the either the chair person or 
bureaucrats of the commission. Nevertheless it is important to underline at this point 
that CoHRI, as argued by two different bureaucrats, seems to increase the accessibility 
of police stations or local governors‟ offices for people representing the civil society.     
The fourth and fifth problems identified above on the basis of the descriptive 
analysis and in-depth interviews do not falsify the Hypothesis II which states that the 
functioning of TBMM as a plenary body form of legislature decreases the level of 
influence CoHRI has in terms of providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. This 
is so; because two problems, which are respectively difficulty of overcoming the 
numerical dominance of the governing party in the commission work for opposition 
parties and the failure of the commission to be an alternative channel for the 
participation of civil society organizations in the earlier phases of law making, can be 
traced back to characteristics of legislative process which are associated with 
legislatures functioning as a plenary body. The relatively greater dominance of the 
legislative process by the governing party, strong adherence to the political party lines 
in the legislative work and in this regard relatively smaller space for non-political party 
actors to involve in the earlier phases of policy making can be considered as 
characteristics of legislatures functioning as plenary body which two problems in 
question can be related to. In this regard two problems in question do not falsify the 
hypothesis that characteristics of legislative process which are associated with 
legislatures functioning as a plenary body render the level of influence CoHRI has in 
terms of providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism weaker in terms of both 
affecting a change throughout the legislation process and oversighting the government 
from a human rights perspective.
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION 
The legitimacy of judicial review seems recently to be under serious critique 
both empirically and theoretically. It seems as if that currently a struggle has been 
started on the part of the legislature in order to reclaim parliaments‟ share in ensuring 
the superiority of the constitution, a role which has been delegated exclusively to the 
judiciary for a long period of time. The criticisms in question reclaim the role of 
branches of government other than the judiciary in ensuring the superiority of the 
constitution (Hiebert, 2005, 2006a, 2006b; Ackerman, 2000). In this regard the 
discussions on alternative models of constitutionalism also re-visions the role of 
national human rights protection mechanisms by widening their scope of function from 
a sole role of monitoring the application of universal human rights at the national level 
to a more participatory role of integrating human rights perspective into the earlier 
phases of policy making and providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism. 
This thesis intention is to understand the location of Turkey within the context of 
the recent struggle which has been started on the part of the legislature to reclaim its 
share in ensuring the superiority of the constitution and constitutional rights. In this 
regard, this thesis specifically focus on Commission on Human Rights Inquiry as it is 
the first national human rights protection mechanism established in Turkey operating at 
the parliamentary level. In this regard a descriptive analysis of the CoHRI‟s 
performance of its functions that are related to providing a pre-emptive right review is 
made. 
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Even though the data that this thesis relies on is limited and therefore it might be 
problematic to infer general conclusions from the data in question; this thesis still 
contributes to the literature on alternative human rights protection mechanisms by 
providing a descriptive case study on a parliamentary commission on human rights in 
Turkey. In this regard this thesis adds to our knowledge of the performance of 
alternative human rights protection mechanisms and to our knowledge of real life 
application of new constitutional ideas. This thesis also contributes to the literature on 
alternative human rights protection mechanisms by setting a framework for future 
research and for the development of institutional reform packages by policy makers.  
The descriptive analysis and the in-depth interviews that I conducted with five 
bureaucrats and three members of the TBMM who worked in the CoHRI suggests that 
CoHRI has relatively limited influence in terms of both affecting a change throughout 
the legislation process and oversighting the government from a human rights 
perspective. Given that problems, which are identified with respect to the relatively 
weaker influence of CoHRI as a pre-emptive right review mechanism, can be traced 
back either to the status of the CoHRI or to the characteristics of the legislatures 
functioning as a plenary body; the descriptive analysis and in-depth interviews does not 
falsify the two hypotheses of this study. 
First three problems, which are respectively the reluctance to assign to CoHRI a 
primary commission (esas komisyon) role, the underperformance of CoHRI of its 
secondary commission (esas komisyon) role and inability of CoHRI‟s reports to be 
integrated into the agenda and debates of the General Assembly, can be traced back to 
the formal rules and procedures both on legislative commissions in general and on 
CoHRI in particular. In this regard three problems in question do not falsify the 
hypothesis that rules and regulations, which form the status of the CoHRI, render the 
level of influence CoHRI has with regards to providing a pre-emptive right review 
mechanism weaker in terms of both affecting a change throughout the legislation 
process and oversighting the government from a human rights perspective. 
Other two problems, which are respectively difficulty of overcoming the 
numerical dominance of the governing party in the commission work for opposition 
parties and the failure of the commission to be an alternative channel for the 
participation of civil society organizations in the earlier phases of law making, can be 
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traced back to characteristics of legislative process which are associated with 
legislatures functioning as a plenary body. The relatively greater dominance of the 
legislative process by the governing party, strong adherence to the political party lines 
in the legislative work and in this regard relatively smaller space for non-political party 
actors to involve in the earlier phases of policy making can be considered as 
characteristics of legislatures functioning as plenary body which two problems in 
question can be related to. In this regard two problems in question do not falsify the 
hypothesis that characteristics of legislative process which are associated with 
legislatures functioning as a plenary body render the level of influence CoHRI has in 
terms of providing a pre-emptive right review mechanism weaker in terms of both 
affecting a change throughout the legislation process and oversighting the government 
from a human rights perspective. 
Given the limited number of in-depth interviews used in this thesis a future 
research, which will improve this study, needs to have a larger number of interviews 
conducted over a longer period of time in order to improve the rigor of findings as to the 
CoHRI‟s performance as a pre-emptive right review mechanism. In this regard an 
approach which would integrate representative proportions of different political parties 
and bureaucrats, who are involved in CoHRI, into the interviewing process would 
enhance the interpretation of descriptive analysis and would allow for comparisons 
among political parties and comparisons between politicians and bureaucrats. Making 
comparisons among political parties might enhance our understanding of different 
perceptions of the various political parties with respect to the CoHRI‟s performance as a 
human rights review mechanism. On the other hand, making comparisons between 
larger segments of political actors interacting with the commission, such as bureaucrats 
and politicians might provide insight into the different approaches that politicians and 
bureaucrats have respectively to the both commission work and its performance as a  
pre-emptive right review mechanism. 
The integration of the members of the General Assembly, of government and 
bureaucrats who are not involved in CoHRI into the interviewing process would also 
improve this study by enhancing our understanding of the influence that CoHRI has in 
terms of both affecting a change throughout the legislation process and oversighting the 
government from a human rights perspective is perceived by the members of the 
legislature, by the government members and by bureaucrats respectively. Making 
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comparisons among political parties and comparisons between politicians and 
bureaucrats might again helpful in inquiring into the different perceptions of different 
actors with regards to the CoHRI‟s performance as a pre-emptive human rights review 
mechanism. 
Another possible improvement on this study would be the inclusion of an 
analysis on the media coverage of CoHRI‟s work given that media is identified as one 
of the most important stakeholders in measuring the committee performance. In this 
regard an analysis on media coverage across time might provide an understanding of the 
trends, if any, on the public visibility of the commission‟s work across time. Moreover 
such analysis might include also an inquiry into the different factors which play 
significant role in increasing the chances of committee work to be covered in the media. 
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